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Abstract
We revisit the problem of low-memory robust simulation of interactive protocols over noisy
channels. Haeupler [FOCS 2014] considered robust simulation of two-party interactive protocols
over oblivious, as well as adaptive, noisy channels. Since the simulation does not need to have
fixed communication pattern, the achieved communication rates can circumvent the lower bound
proved by Kol and Raz [STOC 2013]. However, a drawback of this approach is that each party
needs to remember the whole history of the simulated transcript. In a subsequent manuscript,
Haeupler and Resch considered low-memory simulation. The idea was to view the original
protocol as a computational DAG and only the identities of the nodes are saved (as opposed to
the whole transcript history) for backtracking to reduce memory usage.
In this paper, we consider low-memory robust simulation of more general client-server in-
teractive protocols, in which a leader communicates with other members/servers, who do not
communicate among themselves; this setting can be applied to information-theoretic multi-server
Private Information Retrieval (PIR) schemes. We propose an information-theoretic technique
that converts any correct PIR protocol that assumes reliable channels, into a protocol which is
both correct and private in the presence of a noisy channel while keeping the space complexity
to a minimum. Despite the huge attention that PIR protocols have received in the literature,
the existing works assume that the parties communicate using noiseless channels.
Moreover, we observe that the approach of Haeupler and Resch to just save the nodes in the
aforementioned DAG without taking the transcript history into account will lead to a correctness
issue even for oblivious corruptions. We resolve this issue by saving hashes of prefixes of past
transcripts. Departing from the DAG representation also allows us to accommodate scenarios
where a party can simulate its part of the protocol without any extra knowledge (such as the
DAG representation of the whole protocol). In the the two-party setting, our simulation has the
same dependence on the error rate as in the work of Haeupler, and in the client-server setting it
also depends on the number of servers. Furthermore, since our approach does not remember the
complete transcript history, our current technique can defend only against oblivious corruptions.
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1 Introduction
This paper revisits the problem of low-memory robust simulation of interactive protocols over a
noisy channel that corrupts any  fraction of the transmitted symbols. Interactive protocols over
noiseless communication channels assume that a transmitted message is received as-is. However,
transmitted messages are subject to some bounded type of noise in modern communication channels
in the presence of environmental or adversarial interference. Given an interactive communication
protocol Π, robust simulation converts Π into another communication protocol Π′ over a noisy
channel which is still guaranteed to correctly determine the outcome of the noise-free protocol
Π. The work of Haeupler [15], considered robust simulation of a two-party interactive protocol Π
over a noisy channel with error rate  and could achieve a communication rate of 1 − O(√) for
oblivious corruptions (decided at the onset of the protocol), and a rate of 1 − O(
√
 log log 1 ) for
adaptive corruptions (decided during the execution of the protocol based on the communication
history). The approach in [15] needs to remember the whole history of the simulated transcript, and
a subsequent manuscript by Haeupler and Resch [16] considered low-memory simulation. These
works achieve robust communication by adding redundancy i.e., exchanging hash values. When
hash values do not match, the parties backtrack. The idea for small storage is to view the protocol
Π as a computational DAG and only the identities of the nodes are saved for backtracking to reduce
memory usage. Here are our main contributions.
• We consider low-memory robust simulation of more general client-server1 interactive pro-
tocols, in which a leader (known as Alice) communicates with m other members (known
as Bobs), who do not communicate with one another; the special case of m = 1 lead to a
two-party protocol.
Our communication rate is interesting for small values of m. As we shall see in Section 3.1, for
m = 2 or 4, this setting can be applied to m-server information theoretic private information
retrieval schemes [1, 9].
• We observe that even for the special case of m = 1 and oblivious corruptions, low-memory
simulation is not previously well understood. As we shall explain, the approach in [16] to
just save the nodes in the DAG without taking the transcript history into account will lead
to correctness issue (which is elaborated in Section 3). We resolve this issue by saving hashes
of prefixes of past transcripts. Our information theoretic technique can defend against only
oblivious noisy channels. Note the previous work of [15] that defends against adaptive noisy
channels require large memory usage. As we explain later, in the information-theoretic setting
with low memory where the adversary has access to the shared randomness generation it is
not clear whether adaptive corruptions can be achieved.
Theorem 1.1 (Our Main Result). Suppose Π is an interactive protocol in which the leader Alice
communicates with each of m Bobs through a noiseless channel, and the Bobs do not communicate
with one another; suppose further that at most n bits are transmitted in each channel in Π.
Then, there is a transformation procedure T that, given oracle access to Π for some party X
(either Alice or some Bob), together with parameters n, m, δ ∈ [exp(−Θ(n0.249)), 1n ] and 0 <  < 1
satisfying m ≤ min{n0.25, O(1 )0.199}, will produce an interface for party X in another protocol Π′
such that the following holds.
1. If protocol Π′ is run where the communication channel between Alice and each Bob has obliv-
ious error rate , then, except with probability δ, Π′ correctly simulates Π.
1 In some literature [28], the client-server model refers to the case of one server and many clients. However, in
multi-server private information retrieval schemes [9], there is one client and more than one server. Hence, to avoid
confusion, we will use the terminology of one Alice and many Bobs.
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2. In Π′, for each (noisy) communication channel, the number of bits transmitted is at most
(1 +O(m2.5
√
logm) · √) · n.
3. If party X has a memory usage of MX bits and is involved in κ (= 1 for each Bob, or m
for Alice) communication channels in Π, then its memory usage (in bits) in Π′ is at most
O(κ log 1δ log n) +O(log n) ·MX .
Paper Organization. While we are trying to give the precise results of this paper in the above
description as soon as possible, readers unfamiliar with the formal definitions and settings can first
refer to Section 2. The research background and existing results are given in Section 1.1. An
overview of the contribution and methods of this paper is given in Section 3; in particular, we give
detailed comparisons with the previous works [15, 16]. In Section 3.1, we give an application of
Theorem 1.1 to multi-server private information retrieval schemes [9].
In Section 4, we describe the data structure maintained by each party, and defer proofs related
to hashes and randomness in Section 8. The algorithms are described in Section 5, from both
Alice’s and each Bob’s perspectives. While the overhead and memory usage analysis are relatively
straightforward (given in Section 5), the correctness proof is quite technical. The high-level proof
strategy using potential analysis is described in Section 6, while the most technical proofs are
deferred to Section 7.
1.1 Related Work
The most relevant related works are the aforementioned paper by Haeupler [15] and the subsequent
manuscript [16] that attempted to perform low-memory robust simulation. Naturally, the related
works described in them are also related works for this paper, but for the reader’s convenience, we
recap some of the works that introduced important concepts and results.
Interactive Coding. Schulman [27] was the first to design a coding scheme that tolerates  = 1240
fraction of (oblivious) corruption with some constant communication rate for interactive channels.
Later, Braverman and Rao [6] improved the tolerated error rate to  < 1/4. Franklin et al. [10]
showed that constant rate cannot be achieved if the error rate is above 12 . As mentioned in [15], the
initial interactive coding schemes are not computationally efficient because the involved tree codes
are complicated to construct. Using randomization, later results [3, 4, 13, 14] achieved polynomial-
time coding schemes.
Small Error Rate . For binary symmetric channel with random error rate , Kol and Raz [21] have
achieved rate 1−Θ(
√
 log 1 ), which is optimal for non-adaptive simulation, i.e., the simulation has
a fixed communication pattern. In contrast, by using adaptive coding schemes, the aforementioned
paper [15] can circumvent the above lower bound, and achieve a rate of 1−O(√) against oblivious
corruptions and a rate of 1 − O(
√
 log log 1 ) against adaptive corruptions. As mentioned in [15],
a subsequent work [11] has achieved a better rate of 1 − O( log 1 ) for channels with feedback or
erasure channels.
Multi-party Case. The multi-party case has also been studied for random [5, 25] and adversar-
ial [12, 17] corruptions. However, these constructions use large memory and guarantees only O(1)
communication overhead for some restricted error rates. In contrast, we consider gracefully degrad-
ing communication overhead that tends to 1 as the error rate tends to 0.
Small Memory Usage. According to [16], their model was influenced by the work of Brody et al. [7]
on space-bounded complexity. Moreover, low-memory robust simulation of interactive protocols
has applications in robust circuits design [19,20,24], where the details are described in [16].
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2 Preliminaries
We consider robust simulation of an interactive communication protocol Π between the following
parties: Alice (denoted as A) is the leader, and there are m other members known as Bobs (denoted
as Bi for i ∈ [m]). Each Bob only communicates with Alice and the Bobs do not communicate
with one another. The special case m = 1 is the usual 2-party protocol.
Simplifying Assumptions. The original protocol Π proceeds in synchronous rounds. We describe
what happens in each round from the perspective of Alice. At the beginning of a round, the internal
state of Alice will determine, for each i ∈ [m], whether she is supposed to send 1 bit to, or receive 1
bit from Bi in this round; observe that in general, if the protocol requires Alice to send a message
of t bits, we can view this as t rounds, in each of which Alice sends 1 bit.
In the case that Alice is supposed to send 1 bit to Bi, her internal state will determine the
value of the bit sent to Bi. After the m bits are transmitted between Alice and the m Bobs, the
internal state of Alice will change accordingly, and the protocol goes to the next round. We use
n to denote (an upper bound on) the number of rounds of the protocol. Typically, m is not too
large; in particular, our proofs need m ≤ min{n0.25, O(1 )0.199}. Without loss of generality, we can
assume that after the protocol Π terminates, Alice continues to send imaginary zeroes forever so
that we will never run out of steps to simulate later.
The perspective of each Bob is similar, except that each Bob only communicates with one
Alice. The number of bits needed to store the state of a party is known as their memory usage. For
each i ∈ [m], the transcript between Alice and Bi is a bit string representing the bits transmitted
between them. Clearly, the length-t prefixes (i.e., the first t transmitted bits) of the m transcripts
between Alice and Bobs determine the internal state of Alice at the end of round t. However, in
the original protocol, the memory usage of Alice could be much less than O(mt).
Noisy Communication Channel. The original protocol Π assumes that communication is error
free. In a noisy channel, a round might be corrupted, i.e., the value of the transmitted bit is
flipped when received (without the knowledge of the sender); hence, the transcripts of the two
parties can be different. The error rate of a communication channel between two parties is , if,
for a communication channel through which n′ bits are transmitted in a protocol, the number
of corrupted bits is at most n′. We consider computationally unbounded adversaries in this
paper.
Oblivious vs Adaptive Corruptions. We assume the adversary knows (an upper bound on)
the number n of rounds of the protocol. The adversary is oblivious, if in which rounds corruption
happens is determined at the beginning of the protocol. In particular, if each round is corrupted
independently with probability , the channel is oblivious and has error rate O() with high prob-
ability, by the Chernoff Bound. On the other hand, an adversary is adaptive, if whether to corrupt
a certain round can depend on the bits transmitted in all previous rounds.
Robust Simulation. The goal is to simulate the original protocol Π with another protocol Π′ over
noisy communication channels, without increasing the round complexity or the memory usage too
much. Since communication can be corrupted, parties might have to roll back their computation
when error is detected. This means that parties might need to increase their memory usage.
If one only cares about the final computation output, then a trivial approach might be for all
Bobs to send their inputs to Alice who will perform all the computation. Besides having a large
communication overhead in the case of long inputs, this approach does not respect the intermediate
states of a party, which can be important in some applications, such as private information retrieval
that we will discuss later.
Hence, we define simulation formally as follows. We require that throughout the protocol Π′,
each party maintains a pair (j, s), where j is a round number and s is an internal state in the
3
original protocol Π. We assume that each party has an imaginary write-only state tape with n
entries such that the `-th entry is supposed to store their state at the end of the `-th round of Π.
At the end of each round of the new protocol Π′, the contents of the j-th entry of its state tape is
(over)written with s.
We use δ to denote the failure probability of correct simulation. In this paper, we consider the
range exp(−Θ(n0.249)) ≤ δ ≤ 1n ; since log 1δ = Ω(log n), this can sometimes simplify the expression.
Definition 2.1 (Robust Simulation). A protocol Π′ correctly simulates Π, if at the end of Π′, the
contents of all the state tapes correspond exactly to the internal states of all parties in all rounds
in Π.
In the case that Π is randomized, the joint distribution of the contents of the state tapes is the
same as that of the internal states of all parties in all rounds in Π.
Communication Efficiency. Suppose the original protocol Π takes n rounds (which is also
the number of transmitted bits) and it is simulated by Π′ that takes n′ ≥ n rounds. Then, the
communication rate is nn′ ≤ 1 and the communication overhead is n
′
n ≥ 1.
Some Naive Approaches. Observe that we are aiming to achieve gracefully degrading 1 +
poly(m) ·O(√) communication overhead, i.e., the overhead tends to 1 as  tends to 0. This rules
out certain straightforward approaches that will lead to a communication overhead of at least some
large constant (greater than 1).
• Silent Rounds. As mentioned in [12], Hoza observed that the ability to have silent rounds can
encode information. Essentially, speaking in an odd-numbered round means 1, and speaking
in an even-numbered round means 0. However, this approach will blow up the number of
rounds by a factor of 2.
• Cryptography. If the adversary is computationally bounded, then cryptographical tools (such
as time-stamped messages together with signature schemes) can be used to detect whether a
message has been tampered with. This can lead to a simpler correction mechanism. However,
the use of cryptography will in general lead to a communication overhead of some constant
strictly greater than 1.
3 Overview of Our Contribution
Our approach is based on the work of Haeupler [15] on interactive protocols over noisy channels and
a subsequent manuscript [16] on low-memory simulation. In this section, we will give an overview
of the approach and highlight our contributions and how our techniques differ from the previous
works.
Intuition for Checksum Bits. Suppose, for simplicity, we consider the case where each transmit-
ted bit is flipped independently with probability . The main idea in [15] is that for every epoch of
r transmitted bits in Π, there are c = Θ(1) checksum bits (which can depend on previous epochs).
The term “epoch” can be applied to both the original protocol Π and the transformed protocol Π′,
where one epoch in Π′ can simulate at most one epoch in Π and have some extra computation and
checksum bits.
Suppose further that if an error occurs in some epoch in Π′, the error will eventually be detected
by the checksum bits (maybe in subsequent epochs). Even with these lenient assumptions, Haeu-
pler [15] has derived a lower bound on the communication overhead of this approach as follows. The
checksum bits alone will lead to a communication overhead of at least r+cr . Because the channel
has error rate , each epoch has no error with probability around 1− r, which means each epoch
has to be transmitted, in expectation, 1 + O(r) times. Hence, the communication overhead is at
least max{1 +O(r), 1 + cr} = 1 +O(
√
c), which is achieved when r = Θ(
√
c
 ). We shall later see
that when there are m Bobs, both r and c will depend on m.
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Meeting Point Based Backtracking. As credited by Haeupler [15], their protocol uses meeting
points for backtracking, which originated in Schulman’s first interactive coding paper [26]. The
idea is that when a party is currently at the end of epoch p in Π of the simulation, then for each
k that is a power of two, the party can possibly revert to the end of the epoch indexed by the
following meeting point: MPk(p) := k ·
⌊ p
k
⌋ − k. The following ideas are crucial to the success of
this method.
• Shared Randomness for Hashing. To reduce communication overhead, two parties can find
out if they have a common meeting point by comparing hashes of the relevant prefixes of
their transcript histories. Although inner-product hash uses randomness whose length is the
same as the object to be hashed, one does not need totally independent randomness. In fact,
a seed that is logarithmic in length can be used to generate biased randomness [23] which
will be good enough. Hence, at the beginning of the protocol, parties just need to robustly
agree on this shorter seed.
• Remembering the Transcript. It is important that each party remembers his complete tran-
script, i.e., history of communication. Even though two parties might have different transcript
prefixes of a certain length, they might think that the corresponding meeting point is valid,
because of hash collision or corruption. However, since the original transcript is still available
to each party, as the protocol proceeds, a different randomness will eventually reveal the
discrepancy.
Although the idea of meeting points is intuitive, an intricate potential function was used to
argue that the simulation can be completed with small communication overhead. Intuitively, a
potential function is used to keep track of the progress of the simulation and corruptions made so
far such that if the potential function is large enough, then the original protocol Π is completed.
As we shall see, for small memory, we will use an even more sophisticated potential function.
Challenges for Low-Memory Simulation. The manuscript [16] has attempted to lower the
memory usage of the simulation. The intuition is that if the original protocol Π can be represented
by a DAG with s nodes, then O(log s) bits is needed to store each meeting point. Since at most
O(log n) meeting points are stored, the protocol can be simulated with O(log s log n) bits of memory.
However, we think there are several issues with this approach.
• Too restrictive model. It is assumed that the original protocol Π is somehow transformed into
a DAG that is known by all parties, who must all have the same memory usage. However,
in other settings such as the client-server model, the client party might only have partial
knowledge of the original protocol Π that is relevant to him. Hence, a more desirable trans-
formation should allow a party to simulate its part of the original protocol Π without any
extra knowledge (such as the DAG representing the whole protocol). Furthermore, in the
original protocol Π, the client party might have a much smaller memory usage than the
server party, and it would be undesirable if every party needs to have the same memory usage
in the simulation.
• Just remembering the state is not enough. A careful analysis of the manuscript [16] reveals
that in their approach, only a node is saved in a meeting point, but the information on how
the node was reached (i.e., the transcript) is not saved or used to compute the hash of that
meeting point. After all, the whole point of a low-memory simulation is to avoid remembering
the transcript.
However, this poses a serious correctness issue. The following simple example suggests that
the hash for a meeting point should involve the corresponding prefix of the transcript. Suppose
each of Alice and Bob has an input bit, which is transmitted to the other party in two rounds,
after which the protocol is in node 0 if the bits agree, and in node 1, otherwise. Suppose the
parties initially have different bits. Then, if there is no corruption, the protocol should be
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in node 1 after two rounds. However, if both transmissions are corrupted, then each party
thinks (incorrectly) that the other party has the same bit. If each epoch has 2 rounds, then
both parties will think that they are in node 0 after the first epoch and computing the hash
just based on the node identity will not detect the mistake.
Our Solution: Saving Hashes of Transcript Prefixes. In addition to using hashes to produce
checksums, we observe that they can be used to reduce memory storage for transcript history.
To detect inconsistent transcript history, two parties do not actually need to know their exact
past transcripts, but just need to tell that they are different. Therefore, instead of saving their
whole transcript history, when a party saves a meeting point, it just needs to save the hash of the
corresponding transcript prefix. Even though the underlying intuition is simple, we still need to
pay attention to the following details.
• Sharing Randomness with Low Memory. Recall that to produce one bit of inner product
hash requires a randomness whose length is the same as that of the object to be hashed.
Moreover, since we only remember the hash of a transcript prefix, if hash collision happens for
inconsistent transcript history between two parties, then there is no way to recover correctness.
Hence, to achieve failure probability of at most δ, the hash for a transcript prefix needs to
have at least Ω(log 1δ ) bits.
Even though biased randomness can be produced with a seed of logarithmic length [23], we
cannot afford too much space to store the stretched randomness explicitly. In Section 8, we
will describe a low-memory variant of generating biased randomness that unpacks random
bits from the seed as we need them.
• Saving Transcript Hashes Can Defend Against Only Oblivious Corruptions. At first sight,
since the adversary can observe the shared randomness, it is natural that the hash collision
analysis is valid only for oblivious corruptions. However, the analysis in [15] treated an
adaptive adversary as a collection of oblivious adversaries. By slightly increasing the length
of the checksums, a union bound over the collection of oblivious adversaries can still make
the hash collision analysis work.
However, such an approach cannot work for the hashes of transcripts. The reason is that
in [15], each party remembers its complete transcript history. Hence, even when a hash colli-
sion occurs for some checksum, the underlying discrepancy can still be potentially discovered
later. On the other hand, to carry out such a union bound for the hashes of transcripts, the
length of the hash would have to be as long as the transcript itself, which defeats the purpose
of achieving low memory in the first place. This is a major reason why our current approach
only works for oblivious corruptions.
It was suggested in [15] that encryption can be used against an adaptive adversary that
is computationally bounded. Specifically, one could first encrypt the seed for the shared
randomness. However, even if the adversary does not know the secret biased randomness
initially, once hashes are being produced, the adversary can learn some information about
the biased randomness to make future corruptions. Hence, perhaps as future work, more
careful analysis is required to claim that using cryptography can defend against adaptive
adversaries that are computationally bounded.
Generalization to Client-Server Setting. After replacing the hashes for nodes in [16] with
hashes for transcript prefixes, the meeting point based backtracking approach will work for the
simulation of two-party protocols. When we adapt this approach to a client-server interactive
protocol, the perspective of each Bob (Algorithm 1) is essentially the same as if he is in a two-party
protocol, because he can only see one Alice. On the other hand, for Alice to proceed the simulation,
she needs to make sure that she and all other Bobs have a consistent transcript history; moreover,
if she needs to roll back the computation, she also needs to make sure that there is a common
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meeting point.
After adapting the flow structure of the simulation for Alice, the analysis of communication
overhead and memory usage follows directly from the algorithm parameters. The difficulty is
how to choose the parameters to ensure that the simulation is correct with the desired probability.
When we adapt the potential function analysis in [15] to multiple number of Bobs, the constants will
have a dependence on m, which will eventually affect the communication overhead. From Alice’s
perspective, since there are m channels, each round is m times more likely to be corrupted; hence,
the overhead should be at least 1 + Ω(
√
m), while our current approach achieves 1 + O˜(m2.5 · √).
As we shall see, this dependence on m comes from the complicated potential analysis in Sec-
tion 7.1 for low-memory usage, which is adapted from [15, 16]. In particular, we make some of
the arguments to accommodate for unavailable meeting points more explicit. As future work, the
dependence on m can probably be improved by a better potential analysis.
3.1 Application to Multi-Server Private Information Retrieval Schemes
Private information retrieval (PIR) [9] allows a client to outsource storage of some read-only
data on non-colluding servers such that the client can access part of the data without each server
knowing which part of the data the client really needs.
In the seminal work [9], some N -bit array Arr[1..N ] is stored in each of m servers. To access
some bit in Arr indexed by i ∈ [N ], the client sends a (possibly randomized) message to each of
the m servers, and each of the servers responds with a message. From the responding messages
(and possibly together with the original messages sent to the servers), the client can decode the
bit Arr[i], but each of the servers cannot learn the index i, even with unbounded computational
power. Since this paper concerns the case where the overhead is close to 1, we consider PIR schemes
with explicit constants in the guarantees. The following results are for m = 2, 4 servers, and the
communication complexity refers to the total number of bits transmitted to request one bit of Arr.
Fact 3.1 (Multi-Server PIR Schemes [1,9]). There exist information-theoretic m-server PIR schemes
to store an N -bit array such that the communication complexity to request each bit is:
• 28 4√N + 4 for m = 4 [9], i.e., 7 4√N + 1 bits between the client and each server.
• 4(6N) 13 + 2 for m = 2 [1], i.e., 2(6N) 13 + 1 bits between the client and each server.
We use our technique to consider the case when the communication channel between the client
and each PIR server can be corrupted by oblivious noise. Since each request induces only a constant
number of messages (where each message has O( 4
√
n) bits), it follows that the memory usage is of
the same order as the transcript history. However, our low-memory technique will be useful when
we consider a sequence of PIR requests together. One important property is that the PIR scheme
is history independent, i.e., neither the client nor the servers need to retain any information about
previous requests. This is crucial when the communication channel is noisy, because corrupted
requests in the past will not compromise the security of future requests. Our Theorem 1.1 gives
the following corollary.
Corollary 3.2 (Multi-Server PIR on Noisy Channels). Suppose a client runs a program that needs
to make T PIR requests to an N -bit outsourced array, where each communication channel has
oblivious error rate  and the desired overall failure probability is δ. Then, applying Theorem 1.1,
if the parameters satisfy the hypothesis with (1) n = T · (7 4√N + 1) and m = 4 servers, or (2)
n = T · (2(6N) 13 + 1) and m = 2 servers, the program will run correctly except with probability δ,
PIR security is still maintained, and the following are also achieved.
1. The number of bits transmitted between the client and each server is (1 +O(
√
))n.
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2. If the original memory usage of the program is Mc bits with noiseless PIR channels, then the
new memory usage is O(log 1δ log n+Mc · log n) bits.
3. In addition to storing the N -bit array, the memory usage of each server is O(log 1δ log n +
n
T log n).
4 Data Structure for Hashing Transcripts
In this section, we show how each party can avoid storing the complete simulated transcript of the
original protocol Π. Instead, for each meeting point, a hash for the corresponding transcript will
be sufficient.
Notation. Recall that each epoch contains r rounds of the original protocol Π, which runs in at
most n rounds. We use the array σ[1..p] to denote a party’s view of the transcript in Π up to
epoch p over a (pair-wise) communication channel, i.e., σ[i] (or σi) consists of the r bits sent or
received by that party in epoch i of the original protocol. As discussed in Section 3, a party needs
to remember at least part of σ to ensure correctness of simulation. Moreover, as we shall see, the
simulation is performed for R =
⌈
n
r
⌉
+ Θ(m5n) epochs, which is slightly larger than nr to ensure
correct termination.
Each Bob is involved in only one communication channel. However, Alice is involved with m
Bobs, and needs to keep track of the m communication channels.
Meeting Point. A meeting point is an index p that represents the simulation at the end of epoch p
of the original protocol. The data structure for saving a meeting point consists of the following:
• The index p itself (which takes log2R bits).
• For each involved communication channel, an o-bit long hash Hp of its transcript σ[1..p]. We
shall discuss the long hash in more details in Section 4.1.
• The state of the party at the end of epoch p of the original protocol Π.
Claim 4.1. For Alice, each meeting point takes log2R+MA +m · o bits, where MA is the memory
usage of Alice in the original Π.
4.1 Long Hash for Storing Transcript
Pre-shared Randomness. Since the transcript can have R epochs, its length can be up to R · r
bits. Recall that we wish to produce an o-bit long hash, where each hash bit is obtained using
inner-product hash. Therefore, for each communication channel, we will need some pre-shared
randomness S consisting of o ·R · r = Θ(n · o) bits between the corresponding two parties.
Observe that the communication overhead will be too large if S is transmitted directly. As
observed in [15], we do not need total independence for S and it is sufficient for S to be ρ-biased,
where ρ = 2−o. The reader can refer to [23] for background on biased randomness. As far as
understanding this paper, one just needs to know that the two involving parties can agree on some
shorter random seed core∗, from which S can be extracted such that the resulting hash collision
probability is comparable to truly independent randomness. The following result states the length
of core∗.
Fact 4.2 (Seed for Biased Randomness [23]). Generating ρ-biased randomness of q bits can be done
using Θ(log q + log 1ρ) independent random bits.
However, a party cannot afford to store S explicitly. Given core∗, one should be able to extract
each bit from S when needed. Hence, we will use a weaker version of Fact 4.2, where the seed core∗
has Θ(log 1ρ log q) bits. In Section 8, we shall describe how the following subroutines are achieved.
Most of them are standard in the literature, but we need to pay attention to low memory usage.
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• RobustSend(core∗, t) and RobustReceive(`, t). Provided that the channel corrupts at
most t bits, this protocol allows the sending party to robustly send an `-bit string core∗ to
the receiving party by transmitting Θ(`+ t) bits over the channel, where the memory usage
of both parties is O(`+ log tl ) bits.
• S ← RandInit(core∗, q ∈ Z+, ρ ∈ (0, 1)). With a seed core∗ of Θ(log 1ρ log q) bits, a ρ-biased
random string S of q bits is implicitly initialized, using only Θ(log 1ρ log q) bits of memory
storage.
• S.ExtractBit(i ∈ [1..q]). This subroutine returns the i-th bit of S, using O(log 1ρ log q) bits
of extra memory.
• S.ExtractBlock(p ∈ [1.. qb ], b). If one views S as qb blocks (where each block has b bits), this
subroutine returns the b bits in the p-th block. This can be achieved by calling ExtractBit
with indices in [(p− 1)b+ 1, pb]. Observe that we may omit the argument b, if the block size
b is clear from context.
These subroutines will be used as follows. For hashing the transcript, we use a random seed
core∗ with Θ(o log(R · r · o)) bits long, which will be robustly transmitted between two parties
with at most 2n corruptions2. Each party will implicitly stretch core∗ to a 2−o-biased string S ←
RandInit(core∗, Rro, 2−o) of R · r · o bits. One can view S = (S(p) : p ∈ [R]) as R blocks, where
each block has r ·o bits. Given an index p, the block S(p) ← S.ExtractBlock(p) can be retrieved.
Therefore, the hash Hp for σ[1..p] can be recursively computed as follows.
Definition 4.3 (Inner-Product Hash). Given the previous hash Hp−1 for σ[1..p− 1] and the block
S(p) = (S1, .., So) of o · r bits, we can compute an o-bit hash Hp = H(Hp−1, σp, S(p)) as follows for
each output bit i ∈ [1..o]:
Hp[i] = Hp−1[i] + 〈σp, Si〉 .
Remark 4.4. Because we use inner-product hash, the hash of σ[1..p] will be the same if we append
trailing zeroes to the end of the transcript. Hence, the following proposition [15, Corollary 6.2]
considers hash collision between different transcripts of the same length.
Proposition 4.5 (Hash Collision). Suppose σ and σ̂ are bit strings of the same length, but differ
in at least one bit. Moreover, suppose ρ-biased randomness S is used to produce o-bit inner-product
hashes H and Ĥ for σ and σ̂, respectively, as in Definition 4.3. Then, with probability at least
2−o + ρ, the hashes H and Ĥ are different.
Lemma 4.6 (Hashing Transcripts). Consider an oblivious noisy communication channel between
two parties, who produce o-bit long hashes of their simulated transcripts (in the original Π) using
pre-shared ρ-biased randomness S as in Definition 4.3, where ρ = 2−o. Then, over R epochs of the
simulation, the probability that the two parties ever store meeting points (p,Hp) with the same p
and hash Hp but resulting from different transcripts (of p epochs in Π) is at most
2R2
2o .
Proof. We first condition on any randomness apart from S that might be used in the R epochs or
the oblivious corruption. Since each party will try to store at most R meeting points, there are at
most R2 pairs of meeting points from the two parties. Using ρ = 2−o in Proposition 4.5, each such
pair will lead to a hash collision with probability at most 22o . Hence, the union bound over all R
2
pairs gives the result.
In view of Lemma 4.6, except with the stated failure probability of long hash collision, during
the simulation, each party is able to save enough information to potentially tell whether its meeting
2 As we shall see in Lemma 5.3, the overhead is at most 2 and this means there can be at most 2n corruptions
throughout the whole simulation.
9
point and that of another party correspond to the same transcript prefix. Observe that the failure
event in Lemma 4.6 can compromise the correctness of the simulation. By considering the union
bound over all m ≤ n channels in Lemma 4.6, the following corollary determines the length of the
long hash.
Corollary 4.7 (Length of Long Hash). For 0 < δ ≤ 1n , by choosing the long hash length o =
Θ(log 1δ + log n) = Θ(log
1
δ ), the failure probability of long hash collision is at most δ.
4.2 Short Hash for Comparing Meeting Points (and Other Objects)
Observe that the o-bit long hash in Section 4.1 is too long to be sent directly to the other party.
Whenever two parties wish to compare objects that are too large to be transmitted directly, they
will compute a c-bit short hash for an object first and transmit the short hash instead. Here,
c = Θ(logm) is not too large, and hence, it is quite possible to have a hash collision.
Parameters for Short Hash. We will also use inner-product hash. As we shall see, the largest
object we need to compare is a pair (p,Hp) associated with a meeting point, which takes L :=
log2R+ o bits. Therefore, to produce a c-bit hash, we implicitly need some randomness S with cL
random bits, where S can be 2−c-biased.
Limited Dependence. As we shall see later, we need to apply Chernoff Bound over different
epochs of the transformed protocol Π′. Since we are not aware of a simple way to apply Chernoff
Bound with biased randomness, the randomness for producing the short hash will need to be
refreshed frequently. However, refreshing the randomness for every epoch will lead to too large
communication overhead. As a compromise, the randomness S for producing the short hash is
regenerated independently every I epochs in the transformed protocol Π′, which we call a phase;
we shall see later that I = Θ(log o).
Shared Randomness in Each Phase. At the beginning of each phase, the two parties share
biased randomness S ← RelaxedShareRand as follows.
Definition 4.8 (RelaxedShareRand). The subroutine RelaxedShareRand consists of the
following steps:
1. Alice picks a common core with O(c log cL) bits and use RobustSend(core, I) to transmit
the message to every Bob over the channel. Observe that each Bob can decode the correct
core, if the channel corrupts at most I bits.
2. Using its perceived seed core, each party uses RandInit(core, cL, 2−c) to initialize the 2−c-
biased randomness. Then, it can use ExtractBit repeatedly to extract the cL-bit S.
Definition 4.9 (Short Hash Function). We define the short hash function G as follows. Given
randomness S = (S1, .., Sc) of cL bits and an object O of size at most L bits, G = G(O, S) ∈ {0, 1}c
is as follows: for each output bit i ∈ [1..c], G[i] = 〈O, Si[1..|O|]〉.
Similar to Proposition 4.5, the probability of short hash collision using biased randomness is
given as follows.
Proposition 4.10 (Short Hash Collision). Suppose the channel makes at most I corruptions when
S ← RelaxedShareRand is shared between the two parties. Then, if two parties use its own S
to compute short hashes of different objects with the same size (at most L) as in Definition 4.9, the
probability of hash collision is at most 22c .
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5 Description of Robust Simulation over Noisy Channel
We use the same simulation approach as in [16]. As mentioned before, the major difference is that
for a meeting point, our approach saves the hash of the corresponding transcript prefix (in addition
to the corresponding internal state in Π), while just saving the node in the computation DAG as
in [16] will lead to correctness issues. The reader can first refer to each Bob’s version in Algorithm 1,
which only deals with one communication channel and essentially has the same structure as the
algorithm in [16]; the auxiliary variables α and β are used for correctness analysis in Section 6.
Alice’s version is given in Algorithm 2, which has a more complicated control flow structure, because
simulation can continue only if the transcripts are consistent for all m communication channels.
Hash Dictionary. A party will, for each involved communication channel, maintain a hash dic-
tionary that is denoted by HD. If an index p ∈ [1..R] is saved in HD, then the following information
is stored:
• The index p itself.
• For each Bob, the o-bit long hash of the transcript σ[1..p] as in Definition 4.3, which we denote
as HD[p] as a short hand; if the index p is not saved, we use the convention that HD[p] = ⊥.
For Alice, she needs to store m such o-bit long hashes, because she communicates with m
Bobs. For each i ∈ [m], we use HDi[p] to denote the long hash of the transcript of σi[1..p] with
Bi. Again, if p is not saved, we use the convention that HDi[p] = ⊥.
• The internal state of the party in the original protocol Π at the end of epoch p.
Available Meeting Points. Suppose a party has finished the simulation of Π up to epoch P.
Then, in addition to P, an index p 6= P is saved in HD only if there exists an integer j ≥ 0 such
that p = 2j
⌊
P
2j
⌋ − 2j . This invariant is maintained by Line 39 in Algorithm 1. Observe that the
converse is not true, i.e., it is possible that the index for some j in the above form is not saved.
Remark 5.1. At any moment, the number of saved meeting points is at most log2R = O(log n).
Scale of Meeting Points. Each party maintains some counter k that keeps track of how far
the simulation needs to be rolled back. Whenever k reaches a power of two, then there are two
candidate meeting points of scale k with respect to the current epoch P:
MP1P(k) = k
⌊
P
k
⌋
and MP2P(k) = k
⌊
P
k
⌋− k.
By considering the binary representation of P, MP1P(k) corresponds to setting all its log2 k − 1
least significant digits to zero. One can also verify that for any k ≥ 2 that is a power of two, either
P = MP1P(k), or there exists another power of two k
′ < k such that MP1P(k) = MP2P(k′). Moreover,
since each party is going to roll back to one of its saved meeting points, it is not too difficult to
verify the following invariant.
Fact 5.2 (MP1 is always available). Suppose the simulation has been currently performed up to
epoch P (possibly with some previous rolling back). Then, for any k that is a power of two, any
positive MP1P(k) is a saved meeting point.
High-Level Intuition of the Simulation Algorithm. As mentioned above, each epoch is
supposed to simulate r transmitted bits in the original protocol Π. During simulation, each party
has a variable k that keeps track of how far it is going to roll back the computation. Each epoch
consists of three stages as follows.
1. Verification. In this stage, for each channel, the parties exchange short hashes and try to see
if they have the same k, the same transcript history, and also whether there is any potential
common meeting point. Two counters v1 and v2 are used to keep track of the occurrences of
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MP1 and MP2, respectively. Observe that rolling back can occur only when k reaches a power
of two; hence, when k is a power of 2, there can be potentially 0.5k votes for either counter.
Since a party should roll back only if every other party has the same k, each party also has
a variable E that keeps track of the number of epochs with inconsistent k since its k is reset
to 0.
During the verification, a party first checks if k is consistent with the other party. If not, then
it increases E and does not check the meeting points; if k is consistent, then it checks which
meeting point is common and increases the corresponding vote, with preference given to MP1
over MP2.
2. Computation. In case that a party believes all parties have consistent transcript history and
the same variable k = 1, it will simulate one epoch of the original protocol Π. This increases
the transcript history by r bits.
If a party thinks anything is inconsistent or k 6= 1, then it will perform one dummy epoch
simulation.
3. Transition. The main purpose of this stage is for a party to roll back the computation if
needed.
If its variable E is too large, this means that there are too many epochs with inconsistent k;
in this case, it just resets k and E to 0, and waits for other parties to reset their k to start
over.
Otherwise, when k reaches a power of two and some meeting point has enough votes (at least
0.4k out of 0.5k possible votes), then the party will roll back to that meeting point.
Moreover, at the end of the epoch, each party will remove some meeting points to satisfy the
low-memory requirement.
From the description in Algorithms 1 and 2, it is straightforward to analyze the simulation
overhead and memory usage.
Lemma 5.3 (Simulation Overhead). The communication overhead of Algorithms 1 and 2 is at
most 1 +O(m2.5
√
logm) · √ ≤ 2.
Proof. It suffices to consider Algorithm 1 from one Bob’s perspective.
Transmitting core∗ robustly takes O(log 1δ log n+ n) = O(n), by Lemma 8.2.
The information transmitted in each epoch of Π′ consists of the following:
• The simulation of one epoch in the original Π, which takes r bits.
• There are 8 short hashes which takes 8c bits in total, because each short hash is c-bit long.
• For every I epochs in a phase, each call of the subroutine RelaxedShareRand in Defini-
tion 4.8 takes O(c log cL+ I) = O(c log o+ I) bits.
Hence, the total number of bits transmitted is
O(n) +R · {r + 8c+O( c log oI )} ≤ n+ n ·O(m5r + cr +m5c).
Choosing r = Θ(
√
c
m5
) = Θ(
√
logm
m5
) and recalling that m ≤ O(1 )0.199, the overhead is at most
1 +O(m2.5
√
logm) · √ ≤ 2.
Lemma 5.4 (Memory Usage). Suppose the memory usage of Alice in the original protocol is MA.
Then, the memory usage of Alice in the simulation in Algorithm 2 is O(m log 1δ log n)+O(log n)·MA.
The memory usage of each Bob is similar, as if m = 1.
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Algorithm 1: Robust Simulation over Oblivious Noisy Channel (Bob version)
Input: Original protocol Π, number m of Bobs, number n of bits transmitted in Π, error rate  of
communication channel, failure probability δ ≤ 1n of simulation
1 Let H and G be from Definitions 4.3 and 4.9 respectively with o = Θ(log 1δ ) and c = Θ(logm).
2 Set: r ← Θ(√ cm5 ); R = ⌈nr ⌉+ Θ(m5n); I ← Θ(log o); L← logR+ o.
3 Initialization: P, k, E, v1, v2← 0;
4 HD← ∅ //HD stores tuples of the form (P, H, ξP), where HD[P] returns H.
5 core∗ ← RobustReceive(l = Θ(o logRro) = Θ(log 1δ log n), t = 2n) from Alice.
6 S∗ ← RandInit(core∗, Rro, ρ = 2−o)
7 for
⌈
R
I
⌉
phases do
8 Refresh cL-bit S← RelaxedShareRand with Alice as in Definition 4.8.
9 for I epochs do
10 k← k + 1; k˜← 2dlog2 ke; MP1← k˜ ⌊P/k˜⌋; MP2← MP1− k˜. //Verification Stage: Lines 10 to 20
11 (Gk, G1, G2, GP)← (G(k, S),G((MP1, HD[MP1]), S),G((MP2, HD[MP2]), S),G((P, HD[P]), S)).
12 Send (Gk, G1, G2, GP) to Alice.
13 Receive (G′k, G
′
1, G
′
2, G
′
P) from Alice.
14 if Gk 6= G′k then
15 E← E + 1.
16 else
17 if G1 ∈ {G′1, G′2} then
18 v1← v1 + 1.
19 else if G2 6= ⊥ and G2 ∈ {G′1, G′2} then
20 v2← v2 + 1.
21 if k = 1 and E = 0 and GP = G
′
P then //Computation Stage: Lines 21 to 28
22 P← P + 1;
23 S∗ ← S∗.ExtractBlock(P, b = ro)
24 Simulate epoch-P of Π (with Alice) to get its r-bit transcript σP and updated internal
state ξP in Π.
//The (imaginary) state tape is overwritten for the r rounds in epoch P as in
Definition 2.1.
25 Compute H ← H(HD[P− 1], σP, S∗) and insert (P, H, ξP) into HD.
26 Reset counters: k, E, v1, v2← 0.
27 else
28 Do 1 dummy epoch simulation with Alice.
29 if 2E ≥ k then //Transition Stage: Lines 29 to 39
30 Reset counters: k, E, v1, v2← 0. (β ← 0)
31 else if k = k˜ and v1 ≥ 0.4 · k˜ then
32 Rollback computation: P← MP1 and restore the corresponding local state.
33 Reset counters: k, E, v1, v2← 0. (α← α+ 0.5β; β ← 0; if DAB = 0 then α← 0)
34 else if k = k˜ and v2 ≥ 0.4 · k˜ then
35 Rollback computation: P← MP2 and restore the corresponding local state.
36 Reset counters: k, E, v1, v2← 0. (α← α+ 0.5β; β ← 0; if DAB = 0 then α← 0)
37 else if k = k˜ then
38 v1, v2← 0.
39 For all index p 6= P, remove any (p, ·, ·) in HD for which there exists no integer j ≥ 0 such that
p = 2j
⌊
P/2j
⌋− 2j .
40 return The state tape for the simulation of Π as in Definition 2.1.
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Algorithm 2: Robust Simulation over Oblivious Noisy Channel (Alice version)
Input: Original protocol Π, number m of Bobs, number n of bits transmitted in each channel in Π,
error rate  of communication channel, failure probability δ of simulation
1 Let H and G be from Definition 4.3 and 4.9 respectively with o = Θ(log 1δ ) and c = Θ(logm).
2 Set: r ← Θ(√ cm5 ); R = ⌈nr ⌉+ Θ(m5n); I ← Θ(log o); L← logR+ o.
3 Initialization: P, k, E, v1, v2← 0;
4 HD← ∅ //HD stores tuples of the form (P, (Hi : i ∈ [m]), ξP), where HDi[P] returns Hi.
5 Sample l = Θ(o logRro)-bit core∗ uniformly at random; for each i ∈ [m],
RobustSend(core∗, t = 2n) to Bi.
6 S∗ ← RandInit(core∗, Rro, ρ = 2−o)
7 for
⌈
R
I
⌉
phases do
8 Refresh cL-bit S← RelaxedShareRand with every Bob as in Definition 4.8.
9 for I epochs do
10 k← k + 1; k˜← 2dlog2 ke; MP1← k˜ ⌊P/k˜⌋; MP2← MP1− k˜. //Verification Stage: Lines 10 to 28
11 Compute Gk ← G(k, S).
12 ∀i ∈ [m] : Receive (G′k,i, G′1,i, G′2,i, G′P,i) from Bi.
13 if ∃i ∈ [m] : Gk 6= G′k,i then
14 ∀i ∈ [m] : Send (⊥,⊥,⊥,⊥) to Bi.
15 E← E + 1.
16 else
17 for each i ∈ [m] do
18 Compute
(G1,i, G2,i, GP,i)← (G((MP1, HDi[MP1]), S),G((MP2, HDi[MP2]), S),G((P, HDi[P]), S)).
19 if ∃i ∈ [m] : GP,i 6= G′P,i then
20 ∀i ∈ [m] : GP,i ← ⊥.
21 if ∀i ∈ [m] : G1,i ∈ {G′1,i, G′2,i} then
22 v1← v1 + 1.
23 else if G2 6= ⊥ and ∀i ∈ [m] : G2,i ∈ {G′1,i, G′2,i} then
24 v2← v2 + 1.
25 ∀i ∈ [m] : G1,i ← ⊥.
26 else
27 ∀i ∈ [m] : (G1,i, G2,i)← (⊥,⊥).
28 ∀i ∈ [m] : Send (Gk, G1,i, G2,i, GP,i) to Bi.
29 if k = 1 and E = 0 and ∀i ∈ [m] : GP,i = G′P,i then //Computation Stage: Lines 29 to 37
30 P← P + 1;
31 S∗ ← S∗.ExtractBlock(P, b = ro)
32 Simulate epoch P of Π (with all m Bobs) to get its r-bit transcript σP,i from each channel
for i ∈ [m], and updated internal state ξP in Π.
//The (imaginary) state tape for each channel is overwritten for the r rounds in epoch P
as in Definition 2.1.
33 For each i ∈ [m], compute Hi ← H(HDi[P− 1], σP,i, S∗).
34 Insert (P, (Hi : i ∈ [m]), ξP) into HD.
35 Reset counters: k, E, v1, v2← 0.
36 else
37 Do 1 dummy epoch simulation of r rounds with all m Bobs.
38 The same code as Lines 29 to 39 in Algorithm 1.
39 return The state tapes for the simulation of Π as in Definition 2.1.
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Proof. For processing the pre-shared randomness (for both long and short hashes), the memory
usage is dominated by handling core∗, which takes O(o log n) = O(log 1δ log n) bits.
Since Alice is involved in m communication channels, each of the O(log n) meeting point takes
O(mo) bits for the m long hashes, plus MA bits for the corresponding internal state in Π.
Therefore, the total memory usage is O(m log 1δ log n) +O(log n) ·MA.
6 Correctness of Simulation
While the proofs for communication overhead and memory usage are quite straightforward from
the parameters in Algorithms 1 and 2, the correctness of simulation is more subtle. The following
can be potential correctness issues:
• After R epochs of simulation, the original protocol Π still has not reached the end.
• The original protocol Π has reached the end, but the transcripts of different parties are
inconsistent because of hash collision and/or corruption.
Proof Outline. We adapt the potential function argument in [15, 16] to resolve the above issues.
The novel parts of our analysis are as follows.
• We consider multiple number m of Bobs. Hence, the constants in the original potential
function now all have dependence on m, which will eventually show up in the communication
overhead.
• Similar to [16], we introduce extra variables to accommodate the case when meeting point
MP2 of some scale is unavailable, and make some of the analysis more explicit.
In view of Corollary 4.7, the probability of long hash collision is small. Hence, we can use the
same proof structure as in [15]. A potential function Φ is defined for the following proof strategy.
1. If a corruption or short hash collision does not happen in an epoch, the potential function
increases by some amount.
2. If a corruption or short hash collision happens in an epoch, the potential function decreases
by at most some amount.
3. Except with small probability, the number of short hash collisions is small and comparable
to the number of corruptions.
4. Therefore, if the simulation is run with a sufficient number of epochs, the final potential
function will have a large value, except with small probability. The potential Φ is designed
such that this implies that the simulation of the original protocol is finished.
Potential Function. We use a similar potential function Φ as in [15,16], although some variables
are renamed or decomposed for clarity; it is defined with respect to the variables in Algorithms 1
and 2, together with some additional auxiliary variables. Recall that A denotes Alice and Bi
denotes each Bob. We use AB = {A,B1, . . . , Bm} to denote all parties; when AB is used as a
subscript for a variable, it means the summation of that variable over all parties. For example,
kAB =
∑
i∈AB ki.
Transcript Prefix. Although each party does not remember its complete transcript history, we use
σ[1..P] to denote the transcript prefix that leads to that party’s current internal state in the simu-
lation of Π. In Alice’s case, we use σA,i to denote the transcript corresponding to communication
with Bi. Recall that because of Corollary 4.7, we can assume that there is no long hash collision
in the potential analysis.
Maximal Common Prefix. We define the maximal agreement parameter L as
L := max {l ∈ [1..min{PA, PB1 , ..., PBm}] s.t. ∀i ∈ [m] : σA,i[1..l] = σBi [1..l]} .
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We also define the disagreement parameter Dj := Pj − L, for each party j ∈ AB.
Remark 6.1. Observe that if L reaches
⌈
n
r
⌉
, then all parties have consistent transcripts of at least
n bits in the original protocol Π. This means that the original protocol must have been completed,
and the corresponding state tapes will satisfy Definition 2.1.
Bad Vote Counters. These are known as BVC in [15,16]. For each party j ∈ AB, there is a variable
βj ; these variables keep track of short hash collisions and corruptions related to meeting points.
Each of them can increase by at most one in each epoch; moreover, when one of them increases by
one, then all of them3 must increase by one, if at least one of the following happens during an
epoch:
1. There exists some party j such that v1 of that party increases (Line 18 in Algorithm 1 and
Line 22 in Algorithm 2), but its transcript σj [1..MP1] in some channel actually does not match
σj′ [1..MP1] or σj′ [1..MP2] of the other party j
′. This happens due to short hash collision or
corruption.
2. Similarly, there exists some party j such that its v2 is increased due to short hash collision
or corruption.
3. There exists some party whose v1 or v2 does not increase because the short hash for some
meeting point is corrupted during transmission; in other words, if there were no corruption
for the short hashes of meeting points during transmission in that epoch, then its v1 or v2
would have increased.
The β variables for different parties will be decreased separately. When a party j ∈ AB resets
every counter (Line 30, 33 or 36 in Algorithm 1), we reset βj of that party to zero.
Auxiliary Variables for Missing Meeting Points. In [16], a variable L− is defined to accom-
modate the analysis of missing meeting points. However, we find that the analysis is clearer, if we
consider two variables α and γ as follows.
Bad Vote Accumulator. These variables act as a buffer to accumulate values from the β variables.
For each party j ∈ AB, there is a variable αj , which is modified in the following ways:
1. In Line 33 and 36 in Algorithm 1, just before a party j resets βj to zero, the value of its αj
increases by half of βj .
2. When a party j does a meeting point transition (Line 33 and 36 in Algorithm 1) with DAB = 0
after the transition, its αj is reset to zero.
Corrupted Computation. We have a single variable γ that keeps track of simulation of Π that is
corrupted; it is modified as follows.
1. During the computation stage of an epoch, if ∃j ∈ AB : Dj increases by one, then we call this
epoch suffers a corrupted computation and γ is increased by one.
Note that the increase of Di of a party i caused by rollback does not count as a corrupted
computation and γ does not increase.
3 Increasing all β variables together can simplify the proof. Considering each channel separately might get a better
dependence on m, but we do not see a simple way to achieve so.
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2. Suppose all parties do meeting point transitions with ∀i ∈ AB : 0 < 2DAB < ki = k and
αAB + βAB < 0.1k before the transition and with DAB = 0 after the transition. In this case,
the γ value will decrease by 0.25k. As we shall see in Lemma 7.9, when γ is decreased, it will
never drop below 0.
Intuition for the New Variables α and γ. We explain briefly how these variables are used to
handle the case when some MP2 is missing. Consider some index p = (4n+ 1)2i, which is removed
from HD when a party j reaches P = p + 2i+1. There are two scenarios in which the party needs
to consider p as a potential meeting point, where we will need either αAB or γ to be large for
the potential analysis. If L is close to P, then this means that to roll so further back to p, many
available meeting points are overlooked due to bad votes, which is accumulated by αAB; if L is not
close to P, then this means that there must be many corrupted computations by party j, which is
counted by γ.
We remark that the parties are not aware of the potential function, whose purpose is to analyze
the correctness of the simulation. Now we can define the potential to be
Φ =
{
L− C3DAB + C2kAB − C5EAB − C6αAB − 2C6βAB − C7γ, if ∀i, j ∈ AB : ki = kj ; (1)
L− C3DAB − 0.9C4kAB + C4EAB − C6αAB − C6βAB − C7γ, otherwise. (2)
where the coefficients C2 to C7 are listed in Table 1.
Table 1: Coefficients in Potential Φ
Constants Value
C2 1
C3 6 + 2m
C4 30 + 60m+ 20m
2
C5 6 + 80m+ 116m
2 + 36m3
C6 310m+ 180m
2 + 18m3
C7 12 + 4m
The proof strategy can be summarized in the following technical lemma, whose proof is deferred
to Section 7.
Lemma 6.2 (Technical Lemma for Potential Function). The following statements are true for the
potential function Φ.
1. If there is no corruption or hash collision in an epoch, the potential Φ increases by at least 1;
otherwise, the potential Φ decreases by at most O(m4).
2. Except with probability exp(−Θ(n0.25I )), the number of epochs with short hash collision is at
most O(mn).
3. When the simulation terminates, the agreement parameter L ≥ Φ.
Lemma 6.3 (Correctness of Simulation). Suppose the failure probability satisfies exp(−Θ(n0.25logn )) ≤
δ ≤ 1n . Then, except with probability δ, Algorithms 1 and 2 correctly simulate the protocol Π.
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Proof. By Corollary 4.7, by choosing the length of the long hash to be o = Θ(log 1δ ), the probability
of a long hash collision is at most δ2 .
From the second statement of Lemma 6.2, the probability of having more than Θ(mn) epochs
with short hash collision is at most exp(−Θ(n0.25I )) ≤ exp(−Θ( n
0.25
log log 1
δ
)), since I = O(log o). Since
we have exp(−Θ(n0.25logn )) ≤ δ, it follows that the constant in the big-theta can be chosen such that
exp(−Θ( n0.25
log log 1
δ
)) ≤ δ2 .
Therefore, by the union bound, except with probability δ, there is no long hash collision and
the number of epochs with short hash collisions is at most O(mn). Moreover, since the overhead
is at most 2 from Lemma 5.3, the  error rate of the m channels implies that there can be at most
O(mn) epochs with corruption.
From the first statement of Lemma 6.2, by having a large enough big-theta constant in R =⌈
n
r
⌉
+ Θ(m5n), this implies that finally the potential Φ is at least
⌈
n
r
⌉
.
By the third statement of Lemma 6.2, all parties have an agreed simulation of at least
⌈
n
r
⌉
epochs of Π, which means the simulation of Π is completed.
7 Technical Proofs for Potential Function
This section gives the detailed proof of Lemma 6.2, whose results are adapted from [15, 16] to
multiple number of Bobs. For completeness, we give the full proof here, and emphasize which parts
are novel.
7.1 Lower Bound on Potential Function
This is the first statement of Lemma 6.2, which states how fast the potential function grows during
the simulation.
In Algorithms 1 and 2, an epoch is consistent if DAB = 0 and ∀i, j ∈ AB : ki = kj at the
beginning of the epoch; otherwise, the epoch is inconsistent.
As in [15], we decompose each epoch into three stages: verification, computation and transition.
The first lemma analyzes how the potential function changes when the algorithm goes through the
verification and computation stages.
Lemma 7.1 (Verification and Computation Stages: Similar to Lemma 7.3 in [15]). Fix some
epoch and suppose all parties run their verification and computation stages (e.g., Line 10 to 28 in
Algorithm 1 and Line 10 to 37 in Algorithm 2). If there exists at least one corruption or short
hash collision, the potential decreases by at most O(m4). Furthermore, if the corresponding epoch
is consistent and no corruption occurs, the potential increases by at least one. If the corresponding
epoch is inconsistent and no corruption or short hash collision occurs, the potential increases by at
least two.
Proof. We consider the following two cases:
1. First, we consider the case when there exists at least one corruption or short hash collision.
We use the notations with a superscript ∗ to denote the values before the verification stage
and those without a superscript to denote the values after the computation stage. We also
use a ∆ in front of any variable to denote the change of value to this variable. During the
verification stage and the computation stage, αAB does not change and thus we can ignore
αAB. Let S2, S1 and S0 denote the set of parties in AB with k ≥ 2, k = 1 and k = 0,
respectively, at the end of the computation stage.
Then, we consider the following scenarios:
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(a) ∃i, j ∈ AB : k∗i 6= k∗j and ∀i, j ∈ AB : ki = kj .
Observe that for each party, the variable k is incremented by one during the verification
stage; moreover, the variable will be reset to 0 only if k∗i is initially 0.
Hence, it follows that there exist i 6= j ∈ AB : ki 6= kj . Therefore, this case is impossible.
(b) ∃i, j ∈ AB : k∗i 6= k∗j and ∃i, j ∈ AB : ki 6= kj .
Then, both the potential before the verification stage and after the computation stage
can be evaluated by (2).
For each party i ∈ S0, i should do one epoch simulation in the computation stage; thus,
the potential decreases the most when ∆Di,∆βi,∆γ = 1. For each party i ∈ S1 ∪ S2,
i does 1 dummy epoch simulation in the computation stage and thus the potential
decreases the most when ∆ki,∆βi = 1.
Therefore, the decrease of the potential is at most 0.9C4(|S1| + |S2|) + (m + 1)C6 +
C3|S0|+ C7 = O(m4).
(c) ∀i, j ∈ AB : k∗i = k∗j and ∃i, j ∈ AB : ki 6= kj .
Observe that if the common value k∗i > 0, then it follows that they must have the
common value ki = k
∗
i + 1 ≥ 2 at the end of the computation stage. Hence, we must
have ∀i ∈ AB : k∗i = 0, as well as E∗i = β∗i = 0.
Moreover, in order to have ki 6= kj , there must be at least one party that does actual
epoch simulation and at least one party that does dummy simulation in the computation
stage. Then, from (1) the potential before the verification stage is
Φ∗ = L∗ − C3D∗AB + C2k∗AB − C5E∗AB − 2C6β∗AB − C7γ∗
and from (2) the potential after the computation stage is
Φ = L− C3DAB − 0.9C4kAB + C4EAB − C6βAB − C7γ.
Recall that S1 and S0 denote the set of parties in AB with k = 1 and k = 0, respectively;
in this case, S2 is empty.
For each party i ∈ S0, i does actual simulation in the computation stage and thus
the potential decreases the most when ∆Di,∆βi,∆γ = 1. For each party i ∈ S1, i
should do dummy epoch communication in the computation stage and thus the potential
decreases the most when ∆ki,∆βi = 1. Therefore, the decrease of the potential is at
most 0.9C4|S1|+ (m+ 1)C6 + C3|S0|+ C7 = O(m4).
(d) ∀i, j ∈ AB : k∗i = k∗j and ∀i, j ∈ AB : ki = kj .
Then, the parties should either all do one actual epoch simulation or all do one epoch
dummy simulation in the computation stage. Moreover, both the potential before the
verification stage and after the computation stage can be evaluated by (1).
If all parties do one actual epoch simulation, then we should have ∀i ∈ AB : k∗i = ki =
E∗i = Ei = β
∗
i = 0. The worst case is for all parties i, ∆Di = ∆βi = ∆γ = 1. Therefore,
the decrease of the potential is at most (m+ 1)C3 + (m+ 1)C6 + C7 = O(m
4).
If all parties do dummy simulation, then we should have ∀i ∈ AB : ∆ki = 1. Since C5 <
2C6 and only at most one of Ei and βi can increase, the potential decreases the most when
∆βi = 1. Therefore, the decrease of the potential is at most (m+1)(2C6−C2) = O(m4).
Therefore, the potential decreases at most O(m4).
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2. If no corruption or short hash collision occurs, then the DAB, αAB, βAB and γ values do
not change. Moreover, either all parties perform an actual epoch simulation or all perform
a dummy epoch simulation. Thus, we can ignore the corresponding parts in the potential.
Then, we only need to consider the following three scenarios:
(a) All parties do one actual epoch simulation.
Then, we must have ∀i ∈ AB : k∗i = ki = E∗i = Ei = 0. Moreover, since there is no
corruption or hash collision, it means DAB = 0.
Hence, L increases by one during the computation stage, which implies the potential
increases by one. Note that the epoch is consistent in this scenario.
(b) All parties perform one dummy epoch simulation and ∀i, j ∈ AB : ki = kj .
Observe that for all parties i, ki = k
∗
i + 1, and EAB and L do not change. Thus, the
potential in (1) increases by (m+ 1)C2 ≥ 2 for C2 ≥ 2m+1 . Note that the epoch can be
either consistent or inconsistent in this scenario.
(c) All parties do one dummy epoch communications and ∃i, j ∈ AB : ki 6= kj .
Then, ∆ki = ∆Ei = 1 for each i ∈ AB, while L does not change. Thus, the potential in
(2) increases (m+1)(−0.9C4+C4) ≥ 2 for C4 ≥ 20m+1 . Note that the epoch is inconsistent
in this scenario.
Therefore, the potential increases as required with the C2 and C4 listed in Table 1.
After considering the above two cases, we complete the proof for the statement.
Transition Stage. We define some notions relevant to the transition stage. We call a transition
due to Line 29 an error transition, a transition due to Line 31 or Line 34 a meeting point
transition and any of the remaining transitions a normal transition.
For a party i ∈ AB at position Pi, its set of meeting points is defined to be
MPi := {2j ·
⌊
Pi
2j
⌋− 2j ≥ 0 : j ≥ 0} ∪ {Pi}.
Recall that because of rolling back, a party i might not have saved all its meeting points in MPi,
in which case a meeting point is called missing or unavailable. An index p is a true meeting point
if p ∈ ∩i∈ABMPi and p ≤ L; otherwise, it is a false meeting point.
Before we analyze what happens to the potential function during the transition stage, we es-
tablish some new properties, some of which are relevant to multiple number of Bobs.
Lemma 7.2 (Beginning of Transition Stage). At the beginning of the transition stage, a party must
have E ≤ 0.5(k + 1).
Proof. We consider the following two cases:
1. If the party do one epoch communication right before the transition stage, then both k and
E are reset to 0 and we have E ≤ 0.5(k + 1).
2. Otherwise, by Algorithms 1 and 2, at the end of each epoch, we have 2E′ < k′ or E′ = k′ = 0.
In the next epoch before the transition stage, k′ will increase by one and E′ will increase by
one or stay the same.
If 2E′ < k′, then we have 2(E− 1) ≤ 2E′ < k′ = k− 1, i.e. E < 0.5(k + 1) at the beginning of
the transition stage.
If E′ = k′ = 0, then we have k = 1 and E = 0 or 1 at the beginning of the transition stage.
Thus, we have E ≤ 0.5(k + 1) again.
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Therefore, we complete the proof for the statement.
Lemma 7.3 (Meeting Point Transitions). For any non-empty subset S ⊆ AB, suppose only the
parties in S do meeting point transitions. Then, during the transition stage, the decrease of L is at
most 2 maxi∈S ki − 1 and the increase of DAB is at most m(2 maxi∈S ki − 1).
Proof. Observe that the increase of DAB can only be at most m times the decrease of L when
rollback happens. Thus, it suffices to find the upper bound of the decrease of L.
Since only the parties in S do meeting point transitions, each party i ∈ S can roll back at most
2ki−1. Thus, L can only decrease by at most 2 maxi∈S ki−1, which happens when L equals the P of
the party in S with maximal k. In addition, the increase of DAB is at most m(2 maxi∈S ki− 1).
Lemma 7.4 (True Meeting Point). Suppose k = 2u for some non-negative integer u. If ∀i ∈ AB :
ki = k > DAB, then there is a true meeting point that is a multiple of k.
Proof. Recall that Pi is the current position of party i ∈ AB. Let w be a non-negative integer such
that wk ≤ L < (w + 1)k. Then, we have L+ DAB < (w + 2)k, and ∀i ∈ AB : wk ≤ Pi < (w + 2)k.
Let S1 denote the set of parties i such that wk ≤ Pi < (w + 1)k and S2 denote the set of parties i
such that (w+ 1)k ≤ Pi < (w+ 2)k. Then, for each party i ∈ S1, the party i should have MP1 = wk
and MP2 = (w− 1)k. For each party i ∈ S2, the party i should have MP1 = (w+ 1)k and MP2 = wk.
Hence, all parties should have a true meeting point wk.
Lemma 7.5 (Removing Meeting Points). Suppose p = (2w + 1)2u for some non-negative integers
w and u. Then, we have:
1. For any integer p′ ∈ (p, p+ 2u+1), there exists an integer v ∈ [0, u] such that p = 2v
⌊
p′
2v
⌋
−2v.
2. For any integer p′ ≥ p+ 2u+1, there exists no integer v ≥ 0 such that p = 2v
⌊
p′
2v
⌋
− 2v.
In other words, to remove meeting point p = (2w + 1)2u, a party should reach P = p+ 2u+1.
Proof. Let ∆p = p′−p. For Case 1, considering v ∈ [0, u], we have 2v
⌊
p′
2v
⌋
−2v = p+ 2v
⌊
∆p
2v
⌋
−2v.
Then, since 1 ≤ ∆p ≤ 2u+1 − 1, there always exists an integer v ∈ [0, u] such that
⌊
∆p
2v
⌋
= 1 and
thus 2v
⌊
p′
2v
⌋
− 2v = p.
For Case 2, if v ∈ [0, u], then we have 2v
⌊
p′
2v
⌋
− 2v = p+ 2v
⌊
∆p
2v
⌋
− 2v ≥ p+ 2v
⌊
2u+1
2v
⌋
− 2v =
p+ 2u+1 − 2v > p. Thus, we should consider v ≥ u+ 1. Suppose there exists an integer v ≥ u+ 1
such that p = 2v
⌊
p′
2v
⌋
− 2v. Then, we should have p = w′2v = (2w + 1)2u for a positive integer w′,
which is a contradiction since 2w+ 1 is not even. Therefore, there exists no integer v ≥ 0 such that
p = 2v
⌊
p′
2v
⌋
− 2v.
The following lemma gives an explicit analysis of what happens when some meeting point is
unavailable.
Lemma 7.6 (Implication of Missing True Meeting Points). Suppose k = 2u for some non-negative
integer u, and ∀i ∈ AB : ki = k > DAB. Moreover, suppose any true meeting point that is a multiple
of k (as promised in Lemma 7.4) is not saved by at least one party, i.e., for that party, HD[MP2] = ⊥.
Then, we have αAB ≥ 0.2k or γ ≥ 0.5k.
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Figure 1: Position illustration.
Proof. Recall that Pi is the current position of party i ∈ AB. Let w be a non-negative integer such
that wk ≤ L < (w + 1)k. According to the proof of Lemma 7.4, let S2 denote the set of parties
i such that (w + 1)k ≤ Pi < (w + 2)k. Then, there exists at least one party in S2 whose MP2 at
scale k (which is wk) is missing. Since wk is missing, by Fact 5.2, wk cannot be meeting point one
of any other scale, which implies that w is odd; this allows us to use Lemma 7.5 later.
Let Sm ⊆ S2 denote the set of parties whose MP2 is missing. In Figure 1, let p4 be wk and each
block has length k2 . Then, we have L ∈ [p4, p2). For each party j ∈ Sm, we have Pj ∈ [p2, p0),
MP1 = p2 and MP2 = p4 is missing.
Let t be the epoch when ∀i ∈ AB : ki = k > DAB but there is no true meeting point that is a
multiple of k and is saved by all parties. By Lemma 7.5, each party j ∈ Sm should reach at least
p0 before epoch t to remove p4. For each party j ∈ Sm, let tj be the last epoch when j rolls back
from a position at least p0 to [p2, p0) before epoch t. Suppose party x is one of the parties with
minimum tx in Sm. Let tD be the last epoch when DAB = 0 before epoch tx and pD be the L value
at epoch tD.
Claim 7.7. For each party j ∈ Sm, the party j has no meeting point in [p4, p2) during the epoch
period [tj , t]. Moreover, the party j can only be in [p2, p0) during the epoch period (tj , t].
Proof. For each party j ∈ Sm, by Lemma 7.5, j has at most one meeting point p6 := (w − 1)k in
[p6, p2) to roll back right after epoch tj . Thus, j can only roll back to a position at most p6 and go
forward to recover meeting points in [p4, p2) . But then j also recovers p4 and must reach at least
p0 again to remove p4, which violates the definition of tj . Therefore, j cannot roll back to less than
p2 and can only be in [p2, p0).
Then, we consider the following cases:
1. If pD ≥ p0, then L cannot be in [p4, p2) during the epoch period (tD, t). We prove this result
by contradiction. First, the party x can only be in a position at least p0 during the epoch
period [tD, tx] since pD ≥ p0. Then, by Claim 7.7, x can only be in [p2, p0) after tx. Thus, x
cannot decrease L to be in [p4, p2). Suppose party j 6= x is the first one that rolls back and
decreases L to be in [p4, p2) after tD. Then, by Lemma 7.5 and pD ≥ p0, at first j only has at
most one meeting point p6 in [p6, p2) to roll back after tD. Thus, j can only first roll back to
a position at most p6 and thus set L ≤ p6. Since L should finally be in [p4, p2), L should grow
into [p4, p2) after j rolls back. However, x can only be in [p2, p0) during the epoch period
[tx, t]. Without x, L cannot grow up to [p4, p2) after j rolls back, which is a contradiction.
Therefore, we must have pD < p0.
2. If pD ∈ [p1, p0) and L ≥ p2 at epoch tx, then there exists a party j 6= x such that j rolls back
and sets L ∈ [p4, p2) during the time period (tx, t]. By Lemma 7.5 and pD ∈ [p1, p0), at first
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j only has one meeting point p4 in [p4, p2) to roll back after tD. Thus, j can only first roll
back to a position at most p4 before setting L ∈ [p4, p2). Since by Claim 7.7 x can only be in
[p2, p0) after tx, j can only roll back to a position at most p4.
Observe that for party x, if there is an available meeting point at most p4, then it is at
most p6. If party j rolls back to p6, this will cause L to drop to at most p6, which causes a
contradiction as in the previous case. Hence, party j has to roll back to p4, which is missing
for party x. Therefore, there must be at least 0.4k bad votes, i.e. βj ≥ 0.4k. Then, according
to how α accumulates bad votes from β, we have αAB ≥ 0.2k at epoch t. Notice that after j
rolls back, DAB 6= 0 until t.
3. If pD ∈ [p1, p0) and L < p2 at epoch tx, then there exists a party j ∈ AB such that j rolls
back and sets L < p2 during the epoch period (tD, tx]. By Lemma 7.5 and pD ∈ [p1, p0), at
first j only has one meeting point p4 in [p4, p2) to roll back after tD. Thus, we conclude that
j can only first roll back to a position at most p4 before setting L < p2; as in the previous
case, actually j has to roll back to p4.
Since DAB 6= 0 during (tD, tx] according to the definition of tD, j can only roll back because
of at least 0.4k bad votes, i.e. βj ≥ 0.4k. Then, according to how α accumulates bad votes
from β, we have αAB ≥ 0.2k at epoch t. Notice that after j rolls back, DAB 6= 0 until t.
4. If pD < p1, then the party x should suffer at least
k
2 corrupted computations to reach at least
p0 during the epoch period (tD, tx], i.e. γ ≥ 0.5k.
Remark that this portion of γ will not decrease until t. Recall that the condition for γ to
decrease is as follows: All parties do meeting point transitions with ∀i ∈ AB : 0 < 2DAB <
ki = k
′ and αAB + βAB < 0.1k′ before the transition and with DAB = 0 after the transition.
Then, γ decreases by 0.25k′.
According to the definition of tD, DAB = 0 can only happen again during (tx, t). Then, the
epoch satisfying the above condition can only happen during (tx, t). Since ∀i ∈ AB : 2DAB <
ki = k
′, by Lemma 7.4, there should be another epoch t′ ∈ (tx, t) with ∀i ∈ AB : ki = k′2 > DAB
such that all parties should have a true meeting point. Moreover, that true meeting point is
not saved by at least one party. Otherwise, the parties should suffer more than 0.1 · k2 bad
votes to that true meeting point, i.e. ∀i ∈ AB : βi > 0.05k′ and γ does not decrease. Then,
we can introduce another instance of the above case analysis. Since one of the condition is
αAB + βAB < 0.1k
′, we can directly go to case 4 showing that there should be some party x′
(with similar definition to x) suffering at least 0.5 · k′2 = 0.25k′ corrupted computations during
(tD′ , tx′ ] (with similar definition to tD, tx). Observe that (tD, tx]∩ (tD′ , tx′ ] = ∅ according the
definition of tD and tD′ . Thus, the decrease 0.25k
′ of γ will not cost the portion 0.5k obtained
during (tD, tx].
Therefore, we conclude that αAB ≥ 0.2k or γ ≥ 0.5k.
We are ready to prove the first statement of Lemma 6.2.
Lemma 7.8 (Lower Bound on Potential Function: Similar to Lemma 7.4 in [15]). In every epoch,
if there exists at least one corruption or short hash collision, the potential decreases at most by
(m+1)(2C6−C2) = O(m4). Furthermore, if the corresponding epoch is consistent and no corruption
occurs, the potential increases by at least one. If the corresponding epoch is inconsistent and no
corruption or short hash collision occurs, the potential increases by at least two.
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Proof. We denote with L, D, k, E, α, β and γ the values right before the transition stage and denote
with L′, D′, k′, E′, α′, β′ and γ′ the values after the transition stage. We also use a ∆ in front of
any variable to denote the change of value to this variable during the transition stage.
Given Lemma 7.1, it suffices to show that a transition stage never decreases the potential, i.e.
∆Φ ≥ 0 . We show exactly this, except for one case, in which the potential decreases by a small
constant. In case of the epoch being error and short hash collision free, this constant is shown to be
less than the increase of the preceding computation and verification stage and the total potential
increase for that (inconsistent) epoch is at least two.
We now make the following case distinction according to which combination of transition(s)
occurred in the epoch and whether or not the parties agreed in their k parameter before the
transition:
1. All parties do normal transitions.
Then, no matter ∀i, j ∈ AB : ki = kj or not, all variables measured in the potential do not
change. Thus, ∆Φ = 0.
2. ∃i, j ∈ AB : ki 6= kj and at least one party does non-normal transition.
Then, we use (2) to evaluate the potential before the transition stage. In addition, the γ does
not change, so we can ignore the γ part in the potential. From (2), the potential before the
transition stage is
Φ = L− C3DAB − 0.9C4
∑
i∈AB
ki + C4
∑
i∈AB
Ei − C6
∑
i∈AB
αi − C6
∑
i∈AB
βi.
Let S ⊆ AB be the set of parties that do non-normal transitions. If S 6= AB, then at least
one party does normal transition (and in this case, also at least one party does non-normal
transition). Hence, ∃i, j ∈ AB : k′i 6= k′j after the transition stage and from (2) the potential
is
Φ′ = L′ − C3D′AB − 0.9C4
∑
i∈AB\S
ki + C4
∑
i∈AB\S
Ei − C6
∑
i∈AB\S
αi − C6
∑
i∈S
α′i − C6
∑
i∈AB\S
βi.
If S = AB, then ∀i ∈ AB : k′i = E′i = β′i = 0 after the transition stage and from (1) the
potential is
Φ′ = L′ − C3D′AB − C6
∑
i∈S
α′i.
Observe that in the first equation for Φ′, when S = AB, it reduces to the second equation for
Φ′; hence, we can just use the first equation for Φ′.
We consider the following cases.
(a) Suppose in this epoch, there exists at least one corruption or short hash collision.
The change of the potential can be expressed:
∆Φ = ∆L− C3∆DAB + 0.9C4
∑
i∈S
ki − C4
∑
i∈S
Ei − C6
∑
i∈S
∆αi + C6
∑
i∈S
βi.
According to how α accumulates bad votes from β, we have ∀i ∈ S : ∆αi = α′i − αi ≤
0.5βi. Then, we have −C6
∑
i∈S ∆αi + C6
∑
i∈S βi ≥ −0.5C6
∑
i∈S βi + C6
∑
i∈S βi ≥ 0.
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By Lemma 7.2, we also have Ei ≤ 0.5(ki + 1) for each i ∈ S. Moreover, by Lemma
7.3, the decrease of L is at most 2 maxi∈S ki − 1 and the increase of DAB is at most
m(2 maxi∈S ki − 1). Thus, we have
∆Φ ≥ −(2 max
i∈S
ki − 1)−mC3(2 max
i∈S
ki − 1) + 0.9C4
∑
i∈S
ki − 0.5C4
∑
i∈S
(ki + 1)
= −(2mC3 + 2) max
i∈S
ki + (mC3 + 1) + 0.4C4
∑
i∈S
ki − 0.5C4 · |S|.
Now, we further consider the following different scenarios:
i. maxi∈S ki ≥ 2.
Let S2, S1 and S0 denote the set of parties in S with k ≥ 2, k = 1 and k = 0
respectively. Then, with C4 ≥ 5(1 + mC3), the coefficient of maxi∈S ki is non-
negative. Hence, we can obtain a lower bound of ∆Φ by replacing maxi∈S ki with
2, and truncate values of ki to 2:
∆Φ ≥ 0.3C4|S2| − 3− 3mC3 − 0.1C4|S1| − 0.5C4|S0|.
According the Case 1b in the proof of Lemma 7.1, the potential can only decrease
at most by
3 + 3mC3 + (m+ 1)C6 + C7 + (0.5C4 + C3)|S0|+ C4|S1|+ 0.6C4|S2|
≤3 + 3mC3 + (m+ 1)C6 + C7 + (m+ 1)C4 ≤ (m+ 1)(2C6 − C2)
in the corresponding epoch.
ii. maxi∈S ki ≤ 1.
Then, we can obtain a lower bound of ∆Φ by replacing maxi∈S ki with 1:
∆Φ ≥ −1−mC3 − 0.1C4|S1| − 0.5C4|S0|
where S1 and S0 denote the set of parties in S with k = 1 and k = 0 respectively.
According the Case 1c in the proof of Lemma 7.1, the potential can only decrease
at most by
1 +mC3 + (m+ 1)C6 + C7 + (0.5C4 + C3)|S0|+ C4|S1|
≤1 +mC3 + (m+ 1)C6 + C7 + (m+ 1)C4 ≤ (m+ 1)(2C6 − C2)
in the corresponding epoch.
(b) Suppose no corruption or short hash collision occurs.
Then, ∆Φ can be negative. We need to include the increase of the potential during the
preceding computation and verification stages to make sure the total increase is at least
2, since this epoch is inconsistent. We use the notations with a superscript ∗ to denote
the values at the beginning of an epoch. Since no corruption or short hash collision
happens and ∃i, j ∈ AB : ki 6= kj , all parties go to the branch that increases E and do
one dummy epoch simulation.
This also implies mini∈AB ki ≥ 1. Then, we have ∀i ∈ AB : k∗i = ki − 1 and E∗i = Ei − 1
while the other parameters do not change. Thus, from (2) we have
Φ∗ = L− C3DAB − 0.9C4
∑
i∈AB
(ki − 1) + C4
∑
i∈AB
(Ei − 1)− C6
∑
i∈AB
αi − C6
∑
i∈AB
βi.
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Then, the change of the potential in this epoch is
Φ′−Φ∗ = ∆L−C3∆DAB +0.9C4
∑
i∈S
ki−C4
∑
i∈S
Ei+0.1C4|AB|−C6
∑
i∈S
∆αi+C6
∑
i∈S
βi.
According to how α accumulates bad votes from β, we have ∀i ∈ S : ∆αi = α′i − αi ≤
0.5βi. Then, we have
−C6
∑
i∈S
∆αi + C6
∑
i∈S
βi ≥ −0.5C6
∑
i∈S
βi + C6
∑
i∈S
βi ≥ 0.
By Lemma 7.2, we also have Ei ≤ 0.5(ki + 1) for each i ∈ S. Moreover, by Lemma
7.3, the decrease of L is at most 2 maxi∈S ki − 1 and the increase of DAB is at most
m(2 maxi∈S ki − 1). Thus, we have
Φ′−Φ∗ ≥ −(2 max
i∈S
ki−1)−mC3(2 max
i∈S
ki−1)+0.4C4
∑
i∈S
ki−0.4C4|S|+0.1C4|AB \S|.
If S = AB, then we have maxi∈S ki ≥ 2 since ∃i, j ∈ AB : ki 6= kj . With C4 ≥
5(1 + mC3), we can obtain a lower bound of Φ
′ − Φ∗ by replacing maxi∈S ki with 2.
Then, we have
Φ′ − Φ∗ ≥ −3− 3mC3 + 0.4C4 ≥ 2,
with C4 ≥ 5(5 + 3mC3)/2.
Otherwise, if S 6= AB, then we have maxi∈S ki ≥ 1. With C4 ≥ 5(1 + mC3), we can
obtain a lower bound of Φ′ − Φ∗ by replacing maxi∈S ki with 1. Then, we have
Φ′ − Φ∗ ≥ −1−mC3 + 0.1C4 ≥ 2,
with C4 ≥ 10(3 +mC3).
3. ∀i, j ∈ AB : ki = kj = k and at least one party does error transition.
Then, we can ignore the γ part in the potential since γ does not change in this case. From
(1) the potential before the transition stage is
Φ = L− C3DAB + C2
∑
i∈AB
ki − C5
∑
i∈AB
Ei − C6
∑
i∈AB
αi − 2C6
∑
i∈AB
βi.
Let Se, Sm, Sn ⊆ AB be the set of parties that do error transitions, meeting point transitions
and normal transitions respectively. Then, we consider the following two scenarios:
(a) If Sn 6= ∅, then we should use (2) for the potential. Hence, the potential after the
transition stage is
Φ′ = L′ − C3D′AB − 0.9C4
∑
i∈Sn
ki + C4
∑
i∈Sn
Ei − C6
∑
i∈Sm
α′i − C6
∑
i∈AB\Sm
αi − C6
∑
i∈Sn
βi.
The change of the potential consists of two parts:
∆Φ =∆L− C3∆DAB − 0.9C4
∑
i∈Sn
ki − C2
∑
i∈AB
ki + C4
∑
i∈Sn
Ei + C5
∑
i∈AB
Ei
− C6
∑
i∈Sm
∆αi + C6
∑
i∈Sn
βi + 2C6
∑
i∈AB\Sn
βi.
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We analyze the second part first. According to how α accumulates bad votes from β,
we have ∀i ∈ Sm : ∆αi = α′i − αi ≤ 0.5βi. Then, we have
−C6
∑
i∈Sm
∆αi +C6
∑
i∈Sn
βi + 2C6
∑
i∈AB\Sn
βi ≥ 1.5C6
∑
i∈Sm
βi +C6
∑
i∈Sn
βi + 2C6
∑
i∈Se
βi ≥ 0.
Hence, it remains to analyze the first part. By the condition of the error transition, we
also have 2Ei ≥ k for each i ∈ Se. Moreover, by Lemma 7.3, the decrease of L is at most
2k− 1 and the increase of DAB is at most m(2k− 1). Thus, we have
∆Φ ≥− (2k− 1)−mC3 · (2k− 1)− 0.9C4 · |Sn|k− (m+ 1)C2k
+ C4
∑
i∈Sn
Ei + C5
∑
i∈AB\Se
Ei + 0.5C5 · |Se| · k
=1 +mC3 + C4
∑
i∈Sn
Ei + C5
∑
i∈AB\Se
Ei
+ [0.5C5 · |Se| − 2− 2mC3 − 0.9C4 · |Sn| − (m+ 1)C2]k ≥ 0
with C5 ≥ [4 + 4mC3 + 1.8C4|Sn|+ 2(m+ 1)C2]/|Se|.
(b) If Sn = ∅, then we should use (1) for the potential. Hence, the potential after the
transition stage is
Φ′ = L′ − C3D′AB − C6
∑
i∈Sm
α′i − C6
∑
i∈Se
αi.
Then, the change of the potential is
∆Φ =∆L− C3∆DAB − C2
∑
i∈AB
ki + C5
∑
i∈AB
Ei − C6
∑
i∈Sm
∆αi + 2C6
∑
i∈AB
βi.
According to how α accumulates bad votes from β, we have ∀i ∈ Sm : ∆αi = α′i − αi ≤
0.5βi. Then, we have
−C6
∑
i∈Sm
∆αi + 2C6
∑
i∈AB
βi ≥ 1.5C6
∑
i∈Sm
βi + 2C6
∑
i∈Se
βi ≥ 0.
By the condition of the error transition, we also have 2Ei ≥ k for each i ∈ Se. Moreover,
by Lemma 7.3, the decrease of L is at most 2k − 1 and the increase of DAB is at most
m(2k− 1). Thus, we have
∆Φ ≥− (2k− 1)−mC3(2k− 1)− (m+ 1)C2k + 0.5C5|Se|k + C5
∑
i∈Sm
Ei
≥1 +mC3 + C5
∑
i∈Sm
Ei + [0.5C5|Se| − 2− 2mC3 − (m+ 1)C2]k ≥ 0
with C5 ≥ [4 + 4mC3 + 2(m+ 1)C2]/|Se|.
4. ∀i, j ∈ AB : ki = kj = k, and no error transition occurs, and at least one party does meeting
point transition but not all.
Then, we can ignore the γ part in the potential since γ does not change. From (1) the
potential before the transition stage is
Φ = L− C3DAB + C2
∑
i∈AB
ki − C5
∑
i∈AB
Ei − C6
∑
i∈AB
αi − 2C6
∑
i∈AB
βi.
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Let Sm, Sn ⊆ AB be the set of parties that do meeting point transitions and normal transitions
respectively. Then, after the transition stage, we should use (2) for the potential:
Φ′ = L′ − C3D′AB − 0.9C4
∑
i∈Sn
ki + C4
∑
i∈Sn
Ei − C6
∑
i∈Sm
α′i − C6
∑
i∈Sn
αi − C6
∑
i∈Sn
βi.
Then, the change of the potential consists of two parts:
∆Φ =∆L− C3∆DAB − 0.9C4
∑
i∈Sn
ki − C2
∑
i∈AB
ki + C4
∑
i∈Sn
Ei + C5
∑
i∈AB
Ei
− C6
∑
i∈Sm
∆αi + C6
∑
i∈Sn
βi + 2C6
∑
i∈Sm
βi.
We first show that the second part is non-negative. According to how α accumulates bad
votes from β, we have ∀i ∈ Sm : ∆αi = α′i − αi ≤ 0.5βi. Then, we have
−C6
∑
i∈Sm
∆αi + C6
∑
i∈Sn
βi + 2C6
∑
i∈Sm
βi ≥ C6
∑
i∈Sn
βi + 1.5C6
∑
i∈Sm
βi ≥ 0.
Hence, it suffices to analyze the first part of ∆Φ. By Lemma 7.3, the decrease of L is at most
2k− 1 and the increase of DAB is at most m(2k− 1). Thus, we have
∆Φ ≥− (2k− 1)−mC3(2k− 1)− 0.9C4|Sn|k− (m+ 1)C2k
+ C4
∑
i∈Sn
Ei + C5
∑
i∈AB
Ei + C6
∑
i∈Sn
βi + 1.5C6
∑
i∈Sm
βi
=1 +mC3 + C4
∑
i∈Sn
Ei + C5
∑
i∈AB
Ei + C6
∑
i∈Sn
βi + 1.5C6
∑
i∈Sm
βi
+ [−2− 2mC3 − 0.9C4|Sn| − (m+ 1)C2]k.
(a) There exists a true meeting point that every party has saved.
Then, each party in Sn fails to transition to that meeting point, because of totally more
than 0.1k bad votes. Recalling that all βi’s increase together, we have ∀i ∈ AB : βi >
0.1k.
(b) There is no true meeting point that everyone has saved.
Then, each party in Sm should suffer at least 0.4k bad votes to that meeting point, i.e.
∀i ∈ AB : βi ≥ 0.4k.
Therefore, we have ∀i ∈ AB : βi > 0.1k. Then, we have ∆Φ ≥ 0 with C6 ≥ [40 + 40mC3 +
18C4|Sn|+ 20(m+ 1)C2]/(2|Sn|+ 3|Sm|).
5. The remaining case is that ∀i, j ∈ AB : ki = kj = k and all parties do meeting point
transitions.
Before the transition stage, we should use (1) for the potential:
Φ = L− C3DAB + C2kAB − C5EAB − C6αAB − 2C6βAB − C7γ.
We further consider the following cases.
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(a) D′AB 6= 0.
This means Alice and some Bob transition to different meeting points.
From Alice’s perspective, there are two candidates MP1 and MP2. Observe that among
0.5k votes, Alice must give 0.4k votes for a candidate point, in order for that transition
to happen. Since all parties prefer MP1 if both are available, it follows that if Alice votes
for one candidate in an epoch with no corruption or hash collision, then all other parties
should vote for the same candidate.
Hence, it follows there must be at least 0.4k bad votes, if Alice and some Bob transition
to different meeting points. Thus, we have ∀i ∈ AB : βi ≥ 0.4k and the γ does not
change. Then, from (1) the potential after the transition stage is
Φ′ = L′ − C3D′AB − C6α′AB − C7γ.
According to how α accumulates bad votes from β, we have α′AB − αAB = 0.5βAB. By
Lemma 7.3, the decrease of L is at most 2k − 1 and the increase of DAB is at most
m(2k− 1). Then, we have
∆Φ = ∆L− C3∆DAB − C2kAB + C5EAB − C6(α′AB − αAB) + 2C6βAB
≥ −(2k− 1)−mC3(2k− 1)− (m+ 1)C2k + C5EAB − 0.5C6βAB + 2C6βAB
≥ 1 + C3 + C5EAB + [0.6(m+ 1)C6 − 2− 2mC3 − (m+ 1)C2]k ≥ 0,
with C6 ≥ [10 + 5(m+ 1)C2 + 10mC3]/3(m+ 1).
(b) D′AB = 0 and k ≤ 2DAB.
Then, the γ does not change. From (1) the potential after the transition stage is
Φ′ = L′ − C7γ.
By Lemma 7.3, the decrease of L is at most 2k− 1. Then, we have
∆Φ =∆L+ C3DAB − C2kAB + C5EAB + C6αAB + 2C6βAB
≥− (2k− 1) + 0.5C3k− (m+ 1)C2k + C5EAB + C6αAB + 2C6βAB
=1 + C5EAB + C6αAB + 2C6βAB + [0.5C3 − 2− (m+ 1)C2]k ≥ 0
with C3 ≥ 4 + 2(m+ 1)C2.
(c) D′AB = 0 and k > 2DAB = 0.
Then, it is easy to see that all parties should have the same true meeting point MP1 in
the past k epochs. Moreover, the γ does not change. We further consider two cases.
i. k ≥ 2 or some party transitions to MP2.
If k ≥ 2, then all parties failed to transition to their MP1 in the first half of the past
k epochs because of more than 0.2 · k2 bad votes. If some party transitions to MP2,
then that party should suffer at least 0.4k bad votes to MP2.
Therefore, we have ∀i ∈ AB : βi > 0.1k, i.e. βAB > 0.1(m + 1)k. From (1) the
potential after the transition stage is
Φ′ = L′ − C7γ.
By Lemma 7.3, the decrease of L is at most 2k− 1. Then, we have
∆Φ =∆L− C2kAB + C5EAB + C6αAB + 2C6βAB
≥− (2k− 1)− (m+ 1)C2k + C5EAB + C6αAB + 0.2(m+ 1)C6k
=1 + C5EAB + C6αAB + [0.2(m+ 1)C6 − 2− (m+ 1)C2]k ≥ 0
with C6 ≥ 10/(m+ 1) + 5C2.
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ii. k = 1 and all parties transition to MP1.
In this case, we need to include the increase of the potential during the preceding
computation and verification stages. Since no party does error transition, we should
have ∀i ∈ AB : Ei = 0. Moreover, all parties should do one dummy epoch simulation
in the preceding computation stage. Considering k = 1, E = 0 and DAB = 0,
this means this epoch must suffer some corruption, otherwise all parties should do
one actual epoch simulation. Thus, we only need to make sure the potential does
not decrease too much in this epoch. Since all parties do dummy simulation and
transition to MP1(=P) when k = 1, LAB, DAB and γ do not change. According to
(1), the only variable left that may decrease the potential is kAB, since kAB, EAB,
αAB and βAB are reset to zero after the transition. But it is easy to see that all
parties have kAB = 0 before the epoch. Therefore, the potential does not decrease.
(d) D′AB = 0 and k > 2DAB > 0.
Then, by Lemma 7.4, when ∀i ∈ AB : ki = k2 > DAB, all parties should have a true
meeting point that is a multiple of k2 in the past.
We further consider two cases.
i. Every party has saved that true meeting point.
A failed transition to it means that there are more than 0.1 · k2 bad votes. Therefore,
we have ∀i ∈ AB : βi > 0.05k, i.e. βAB > 0.05(m + 1)k ≥ 0.1k. Thus, the γ does
not change.
From (1) the potential after the transition stage is
Φ′ = L′ − C7γ.
By Lemma 7.3, the decrease of L is at most 2k− 1. Then, we have
∆Φ =∆L+ C3DAB − C2kAB + C5EAB + C6αAB + 2C6βAB
≥− (2k− 1) + C3DAB − (m+ 1)C2k + C5EAB + C6αAB + 0.1(m+ 1)C6k
=1 + C3DAB + C5EAB + C6αAB + [0.1(m+ 1)C6 − 2− (m+ 1)C2]k ≥ 0
with C6 ≥ 20/(m+ 1) + 10C2.
ii. Some party has not saved that true meeting point.
From (1) the potential after the transition stage is
Φ′ = L′ − C7γ′,
and thus
∆Φ =∆L+ C3DAB − C2kAB + C5EAB + C6αAB + 2C6βAB − C7∆γ.
By Lemma 7.3, the decrease of L is at most 2k − 1. Moreover, by Lemma 7.6, we
have αAB ≥ 0.1k or γ ≥ 0.25k in the past when ∀i ∈ AB : ki = k2 > DAB.
If αAB + βAB < 0.1k, then ∆γ = −0.25k according to how γ decreases. By Lemma
7.6 we should have large enough γ ≥ 0.25k. Then, we have
∆Φ ≥− (2k− 1) + C3DAB − (m+ 1)C2k + C5EAB + C6αAB + 2C6βAB + 0.25C7k
=1 + C3DAB + C5EAB + C6αAB + 2C6βAB + [0.25C7 − 2− (m+ 1)C2]k ≥ 0
with C7 ≥ 8 + 4(m+ 1)C2.
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Otherwise, if αAB + βAB ≥ 0.1k, then ∆γ = 0 and we have
∆Φ ≥− (2k− 1) + C3DAB − (m+ 1)C2k + C5EAB + 0.1C6k + C6βAB
=1 + C3DAB + C5EAB + C6βAB + [0.1C6 − 2− (m+ 1)C2]k ≥ 0
with C6 ≥ 20 + 10(m+ 1)C2.
Combining the proof of Lemma 7.1, if there exists at least one corruption or short hash collision,
the potential decreases by at most (m + 1)(2C6 − C2), which happens when ∀i, j ∈ AB : ki = kj .
Moreover, if there is no corruption or short hash collision, the potential increases as required in the
statement.
Actually, Case 5d of Lemma 7.8 contains the argument that γ is always non-negative. However,
for completeness, we extract that part out in the following lemma.
Lemma 7.9. The variable γ is always non-negative.
Proof. Initially, γ = 0. Hence, it suffices to check that whenever γ is decreased, it never drops
below 0. Recall that the condition for γ to decrease is as follows: All parties do meeting point
transitions with ∀i ∈ AB : 0 < 2DAB < ki = k and αAB +βAB < 0.1k before the transition and with
DAB = 0 after the transition. Then, γ decreases by 0.25k.
Since ∀i ∈ AB : 2DAB < ki = k, by Lemma 7.4, when ∀i ∈ AB : ki = k2 > DAB, all parties
should have a true meeting point that is a multiple of k2 in the past. We consider the following two
cases.
1. Every party has saved that true meeting point.
A failed transition to it means that there are more than 0.1 · k2 bad votes. Therefore, we have
∀i ∈ AB : βi > 0.05k, i.e. βAB > 0.05(m + 1)k ≥ 0.1k. Thus, the γ does not change in this
case.
2. Some party has not saved that true meeting point.
By Lemma 7.6, we have αAB ≥ 0.1k or γ ≥ 0.25k in the past when ∀i ∈ AB : ki = k2 > DAB.
Since αAB + βAB < 0.1k, we should have large enough γ ≥ 0.25k when γ decreases.
7.2 Upper Bound on Potential Function
We next prove the third statement of Lemma 6.2, i.e., the potential Φ cannot grow too fast. In
particular, it grows naturally by one per epoch when a correct computation step is performed. On
the other hand, any corruption also cannot increase this too much.
Lemma 7.10 (Upper Bound on Potential Function: Similar to Lemma 7.5 in [15]). The final
potential Φ after R epochs satisfies Φ ≤ L ≤ R.
Proof. Since L can increase at most by one in each epoch, we have L ≤ R. It suffices to consider
the following cases.
Case 1: When ∃i, j ∈ AB : ki 6= kj , from (2) we have
Φ = L− C3DAB − 0.9C4kAB + C4EAB − C6αAB − C6βAB − C7γ.
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It is easy to see that at the end of each epoch, we have 2Ei < ki for each party i ∈ AB, i.e.
2EAB < kAB. Thus, we have
Φ < L− C3DAB − 0.9C4kAB + 0.5C4kAB − C6αAB − C6βAB − C7γ ≤ L ≤ R.
Case 2: When ∀i, j ∈ AB : ki = kj = k, from (1) we have
Φ = L− C3DAB + C2kAB − C5EAB − C6αAB − 2C6βAB − C7γ.
Notice that if k ≤ 2DAB, then −C3DAB + C2kAB ≤ −(m + 3)k + (m + 1)k ≤ 0, i.e. Φ ≤ L ≤ R.
Thus, we should consider k > 2DAB next. Let j be an integer such that 2
j ≤ k < 2j+1 and t be
the epoch in the past when k grows to be 2j = k∗. Then, the increase of the potential from epoch
t to the last epoch is at most C2(m + 1)(k − k∗) < (m + 1)k∗. Since 2j+1 > k > 2DAB, we have
2j = k∗ > DAB. Then, by Lemma 7.4, there is a true meeting point p∗ that is a multiple of k∗
during epoch t.
We considering the following cases:
1. Every party has saved p∗.
A party fails to transition to the true meeting point p∗ because of more than 0.1k∗ corrupted
votes, i.e. ∀i ∈ AB : βi > 0.1k∗. Thus, after adding the following increase (m + 1)k∗ of the
potential, the final potential is
Φ < L− C3DAB + (m+ 1)k∗ − C5EAB − C6αAB − 0.2C6(m+ 1)k∗ − C7γ + (m+ 1)k∗
= L− C3DAB − C5EAB − C6αAB − C7γ − (0.2C6 − 2)(m+ 1)k∗
< L ≤ R.
2. Some party has not saved p∗.
This is because p∗ is the missing MP2 for that party. Then, by Lemma 7.6 we should have
αAB ≥ 0.2k∗ or γ ≥ 0.5k∗. Thus, after adding the following increase (m+1)k∗ of the potential,
the final potential is
Φ ≤ L− C3DAB + (m+ 1)k∗ − C5EAB − 2C6βAB − 0.2C6k∗ − C7γ + (m+ 1)k∗
= L− C3DAB − C5EAB − C6βAB − C7γ − (0.2C6 − 2m− 2)k∗
< L ≤ R.
or
Φ ≤ L− C3DAB + (m+ 1)k∗ − C5EAB − C6αAB − 2C6βAB − 0.5(4m+ 12)k∗ + (m+ 1)k∗
= L− C3DAB − C5EAB − C6αAB − 2C6βAB − 4k∗
< L ≤ R.
Therefore, we conclude that the final potential Φ after R epochs is at most L ≤ R.
7.3 Bounding the Number of Short Hash Collisions
Next, we prove the second statement of Lemma 6.2, which bounds the number of epochs with short
hash collisions. Since the randomness for short hashes are shared for epochs in the same phase, we
use the following version of Chernoff Bound.
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Theorem 7.11 (Chernoff Bound [8]). Let X1, .., Xk be independent random variables such that
Xi ∈ [0, z] for a positive constant z. Define X =
∑
iXi and µ = E[X]. Then, for any σ ≥ 1,
Pr[X ≥ (1 + σ)µ] ≤ exp(−σµ
3z
).
Now we can show that the number of short hash collisions in Algorithms 1 and 2 is small as
follows.
Lemma 7.12 (Number of Epochs with Short Hash Collision: Similar to Lemma 7.6 in [15]). By
choosing the length of the short hash to be c = Θ(logm), the probability that there are more than
Θ(mn) epochs with short hash collisions is at most exp(−Θ(n0.25/I)).
Proof. As observed in [15], short hash collisions only matter during inconsistent epochs. Let d be
the number of inconsistent epochs. Hence, we only need to consider the case when d ≥ Θ(mn).
Let h be the number of inconsistent epochs with short hash collisions.
In an inconsistent epoch, each of the m channels compares 4 short hashes (each having c bits),
which are computed using 2−c-biased randomness. Hence, the probability p that there exists a
short hash collision in an inconsistent epoch satisfies p ≤ O(m2c ).
Lemma 7.8 shows that the potential increases at least by 1 in a consistent epoch and by 2 in an
inconsistent epoch if no error or short hash collision happens. Otherwise, the potential decreases at
most by a fixed constant C− = (m+ 1)(2C6 −C2) = Θ(m4). Assuming Rr ≤ 2n as in Lemma 6.3,
the number of epochs with corruptions is at most 2mn.
Hence, the total potential change during inconsistent epochs is therefore at least 2(d − h −
2mn) − C−(h + 2mn) while the potential accumulated in consistent epochs is at least R − d −
2mn− C−(2mn). Hence, the final potential is at least R+ d− 2h− 6mn− C−(h+ 4mn).
From Lemma 7.10, we get however that the total potential is at most R. Together this implies
d ≤ (2+C−)h+Θ(mn). Thus, since d ≥ Θ(mn) is sufficiently large, it follows that hd ≥ 12(2+C−) ≥
2p, where the last inequality holds if we set c = Θ(logm) large enough such that p = Θ( 1
m4
).
Finally, observe that in the d inconsistent epochs, the I epochs in the same phase share the
same randomness for short hashes, while epochs in different phases use independent randomness.
Therefore, by the version of Chernoff Bound in Theorem 7.11, Pr[h ≥ 2dp] ≤ exp(−Θ(dpI )) ≤
exp(−Θ(n0.25I )), where the last inequality follows because we assume m ≤ n0.25.
8 Subroutines for Pre-shared Randomness
In this section, we describe the subroutines to handle pre-shared randomness used for hashing.
Most of the ideas are standard in the literature, but we need to use variants that have low memory
usage.
8.1 Robust Transmission
As in [15], we use error correcting code. In particular, we use the following variant.
Lemma 8.1 (Justesen Code [18, 22]). Given any positive integers ` and t, there exists a Justesen
Code encoding a message of ` bits to a codeword of Θ(` + t) bits such that the codewords have
minimum distance at least 2t+ 1. In particular, the original message can be retrieved with at most
t corrupted bits.
Recall that our goal is to transmit an `-bit message over a channel that corrupts at most t bits.
Justesen code in Lemma 8.1 can directly achieve this, but it takes Ω(`+ t) bits of memory, which
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might be undesirable when t `. The subroutine in Algorithm 3 uses O(`+ log t`) bits of memory,
where Alice is the sender and Bob is the receiver.
For the case t ≥ `, the protocol uses a Justesen code with minimum distance at least 2` + 1,
and the sender repeatedly transmits the encoding of the original message for 2
⌈
t
`
⌉
+ 1 iterations.
If the channel corrupts at most t bits, then the receiver fails to retrieve the original message for at
most
⌊
t
`
⌋
iterations. Therefore, the BoyerMoore majority vote algorithm [2] in Line 10 to 19 will
be able to correctly identity the original message.
Algorithm 3: RobustSend(core, t) and RobustReceive(`, t)
Input: Alice wishes to transmit an `-bit message core to Bob over a channel that can corrupt at
most t bits.
1 If t < `, then use the Justesen code in Lemma 8.1 directly; otherwise, do the following.
2 We use the Justesen code that encodes an `-bit message into an Θ(`)-bit codeword such that the
minimum distance is at least 2`+ 1; let Encode and Decode be the functions associated with the
encoding.
3 procedure RobustSend(core, t) //Alice is the sender
4 Codeword W← Encode(core)
5 for 2 dt/le+ 1 iterations do
6 Send W to Bob //Send codeword to Bob
8 return;
9 procedure RobustReceive(`, t) //Bob is the receiver
10 core∗ ← {0}l; Counter CNT← 0
11 for 2 dt/le+ 1 iterations do //Less than half of the codewords can be corrupted
12 Receive W′ from Alice //Receive (corrupted) codeword from Alice
13 core′ ← Decode(W′)
14 if CNT = 0 then
15 core∗ ← core′; CNT← 1
16 else if core′ = core∗ then
17 CNT← CNT + 1
18 else
19 CNT← CNT− 1
20 return Received message core∗
Lemma 8.2. The total number of bits sent in Algorithm 3 is Θ(` + t). The memory usage is
O(`+ log t`).
Proof. For t < `, the statement follows immediately. Otherwise, only one codeword of Θ(l) bits is
exchanged during each of the 2 dt/le + 1 iterations. Thus, the total number of bits exchanged is
Θ(`+ t).
For the memory usage, each codeword takes O(`) bits and each counter takes O(log t`) bits.
8.2 Generating Biased Randomness with Low Memory Usage
As in [15], we use the technique of generating ρ-biased q-bit randomness with a short seed [23].
High Level Intuition. The idea is to consider a constant degree expander graph with Θ(q)
vertices, each of which is labeled with some suitably chosen q-bit vector. To generate ρ-biased
randomness, one first picks a starting vertex uniformly at random (which takes O(log q) bits) and
performs a random walk for l = O(log 1ρ) steps (which takes O(l) random bits). Then, each visited
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vertex is selected independently with probability 12 (which takes l random bits). Finally, a q-bit
randomness is formed by summing up the vectors corresponding to the chosen vertices. Hence,
given the expander graph, the length of the seed is O(l + log q).
Memory Usage. To use the above approach, each party needs to have access to the expander
graph, which takes Ω(q2) bits to store. To ensure low memory usage, we do not rely on the expander
graph. In some sense, instead of using a random walk with a random starting vertex, we just pick
an independent vertex uniformly at random each time, where the vector associated with a vertex
does not need to be stored explicitly. Therefore, in our approach, the length of the seed is O(l log q),
which is slightly longer.
Construction. For completeness, we outline the construction. First, we assume that q is a power
of 2, which can be achieved by rounding to the next power of 2. We use the finite field Fq with
order q, where each element can be represented by log2 q bits. Hence, we also fix some bijection
rank : Fq → [1..q] and label the elements Fq = {v1, . . . , vq} such that rank(vj) = j.
Polynomial Evaluation. Given a vector b ∈ Fkq , we index its coordinates with [0..k − 1]. For
v ∈ Fq, we denote EvalPoly(b, v) :=
∑k−1
j=0 bjv
j . The following result follows from standard linear
algebra.
Fact 8.3 (k-wise Independence). Suppose b ∈ Fkq is selected uniformly at random. Then, the
induced sequence (EvalPoly(b, v) : v ∈ Fq) of q elements is k-wise independent.
Algorithm 4 is adapted from [23, Section 3.1.1], and we include it here for completeness.
Algorithm 4: ρ-Biased q-Bit Randomness Generator
Input: Finite field Fq = {v1, . . . , vq} and bijection rank : Fq → [1..q] such that rank(vj) = j.
1 procedure RandInit(core∗, q ∈ Z, ρ ∈ (0, 1))
2 l← Θ(log 1ρ )
3 Use the Θ(l log q) bits in core∗ to initialize the following variables (independently uniformly at
random) from their respective domains.
4 Pick a ∈ {0, 1}l, using l bits.
5 for each 1 ≤ t ≤ l do
6 Pick b(t) ∈ F7q, using 7 log q bits.
7 Pick c(t) ∈ {0, 1}log q, using log q bits.
8 Pick d(t) ∈ F2q, using 2 log q bits.
9 return S ← (a,b, c,d)
10 procedure S.ExtractBit(i ∈ [1..q])
11 Set v ∈ Fq such that rank(v) = i.
12 for each 1 ≤ t ≤ l do
13 ut ← EvalPoly(b(t), v) ∈ Fq
14 if rank(ut) mod 2 = 0 then
15 rt ← 0
16 else
17 zt ← EvalPoly(d(t), v) ∈ Fq
18 jt ← max{1, dlog2 rank(zt)e}
19 rt ← c(t)jt ∈ {0, 1}
20 return
∑l
t=1 atrt mod 2
Fact 8.4. In Algorithm 4, RandInit takes and stores Θ(log 1ρ log q) bits, and ExtractBit needs
only O(log 1ρ log q) bits of memory usage.
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